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ABSTRACT 
 
Smallholder irrigation schemes (SISs) face several challenges hindering them from performing 
at satisfactory levels. In South Africa, the government made considerable financial investments 
in developing SISs and revitalising them to improve their performance. However, poor 
performance persisted, indicating that the key root of poor performance could lie elsewhere, 
e.g., weak institutional arrangements, an aspect which is often overlooked, and in an 
inequitable distribution of land and other productive resources across intergenerational and 
gender dimensions. Researchers have argued that the absence of effective management regimes 
was underpinning the poor performance of SISs.  
This study sought to assess the effects of the interaction between governance, on one hand, and 
intergenerational and gender dimensions, on the other, on the performance of SIS in KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa. The specific objectives were to describe the institutional arrangements for 
water management in SISs, to identify the determinants of farmer awareness of water 
governance dimensions across intergenerational and gender dimensions in SISs, and to 
investigate the effects of governance on cropland allocation across gender and intergenerational 
dimensions in SISs. The study was conducted in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry Irrigation Schemes 
located in Msinga Local Municipality and Ndumo Irrigation Scheme located in Jozini Local 
Municipality. Primary data were collected through focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews and a structured household questionnaire administered by Zulu-speaking 
enumerators. Stratified and systematic random sampling techniques were employed to select 
survey respondents.  
Empirical models used were the Descriptive Statistical technique, Principal Component 
Analysis, Ordinary Least Squares technique and Fractional Regression Generalized Linear 
model. The results indicated that the studied irrigation schemes had functional institutional 
arrangements, and all schemes had scheme committees, i.e., the leaders responsible for 
ensuring that all the scheme rules and policies are obeyed. Furthermore, the study revealed that 
formal water institutions were unknown and non-existence at the local level which led to a high 
reliance on informal institutional arrangements for water resource management. The 
statistically significant determinants of farmer awareness of water governance dimensions were 
along the gender, level of education, water management training, scheme location, membership 
in water users association, stakeholder participation, farmer’s involvement in scheme decision-
making processes, and source of information. Age of an irrigator, size of a plot, type of land 
vi 
 
ownership, access to credit, revenue (farm income), and irrigation water sufficiency were found 
to have a significant influence on cropland allocation decisions. Through the application of 
Fractional Logit Generalised Linear Model, the study concludes that gender of an irrigator, 
farmer perceptions with scheme water governance and irrigation water schedule do not 
influence farmer decisions on cropland allocation in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo 
irrigation schemes.  
There is a need to raise irrigators’ awareness about formal water institutions, their intentions 
and the importance of knowing them. In addition, irrigators need to be capacitated on best 
management practices and in making informed production decisions. Therefore, improvements 
in communication between irrigators and external stakeholders are critical. Moreover, 
government and policymakers must incorporate customary laws when formulating national 
laws to increase compliance by smallholder irrigators with formal water institutions. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
South African agriculture can be understood as being dualistic or dichotomous consisting of 
commercial farmers and smallholder (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF), 2015; Moswetsi et al., 2017), jointly occupying about 1 354 127 million hectare (ha) 
of total irrigated area where 40 624 ha (3%) are smallholder irrigation schemes (SISs) 
(Fanadzo, 2012; Stevens & Van Koppen, 2015). In South Africa (SA), agriculture is a primary 
source of livelihood for about 200 000 – 230 000 rural black people (Magingxa et al., 2009 and 
acts as a source of income and employment (Naamwintome & Bagson, 2013). The agricultural 
sector employs about 35% of the total population globally and about 86.8% in Africa, SA 
included (Naamwintome & Bagson, 2013). Between the period 1948 to 1962, the agricultural 
sector played a substantial role in providing employment for South African population which 
grew at an average of 0.88% annually. However, this rate declined by 1.52% between the 
period of 1963 to 2010 due to government policies impeding export opportunities and 
encourage the adoption of labour-saving technologies (Greyling, 2012). Despite all this, 
agriculture remains an important sector in terms of employment in SA (Xingwana, 2007). The 
Directorate of Agricultural Statistics (DAS) (2015) indicated that the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in SA is relatively small and 
continuously dropping. In 1969, the sector made about 7.7% contribution in the GDP, 5.3% in 
1988 while it contributed about 2.5% in 2015 (Grain SA, 2015).  
SA experiences shortages in water supply with increasing water demand for irrigation and 
water basic needs. On average, over 60% of the country receives below 500 mm of rainfall per 
annum and thus considered as the 30th driest country in the world (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). 
Projections reveal that most parts of the world currently experience water scarcity will become 
drier and more prone to droughts (Johansson, 2016). The agricultural sector is expected to meet 
the increasing food demand emanating from the expanding world population, that is estimated 
to reach 8.5 billion by the year 2030 with unreliable rainfall patterns and increasing water 
scarcity (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). In this situation, irrigation becomes an alternative. It 
stabilizes food production as it safeguards against erratic rainfall patterns (Van Averbeke et al., 
2011; Cobourn et al., 2017). According to Svendsen et al. (2009) and Garcia-Bolanos et al. 
(2011), most African countries have realised the potential of irrigation in enhancing agricultural 
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productivity, creating employment, promoting economic growth and thus, contributing to 
poverty reduction. About 9.5% of the total cultivated area in SA is under irrigation (Svendsen 
et al., 2009) and consumes approximately 62% of available water in the country (Fanadzo & 
Ncube, 2018). Therefore, efficient use of irrigation water is critical as irrigation is the largest 
consumer of water and where most water losses occur, approximately 30 – 40% (Fanadzo & 
Ncube, 2018).   
Following the recognition of the irrigation potential, the government established SISs to 
improve rural livelihoods through sustainable food production for food security and poverty 
alleviation (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). In SA, SISs are viewed as one of the key strategies for 
increasing agricultural productivity in communal areas and for achieving the key objectives of 
the National Development Plan (NDP) and the New Growth Path (NGP) (Cousins, 2013; 
Sinyolo et al., 2014; Mvelase, 2016). The NDP intends to eliminate poverty and reduce 
inequality by the year 2030 (The Government of South Africa, 2018). It proposes that the NDP-
Vision for 2030 can be realised through the expansion of smallholder farming. The NGP aims 
to enhance growth, create employment and equity (The Government of South Africa, 2018). It 
proposes to create five million jobs over the next ten decades. It further clarifies that of the five 
million jobs, one million can be created through labour-intensive forms of small-scale farming 
in communal areas and on redistributed land, with many engaged in irrigated farming (Cousins, 
2013). However, the development objectives of the SISs remain largely unfulfilled due to 
several challenges hindering them from performing at satisfactory levels (Fanadzo & Ncube, 
2018). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
There has been a widespread concern about the poor performance of SIS in SA as most 
researchers who have assessed the performance of SISs in SA indicated that many of them 
performed below the expected levels (Machethe et al., 2004; Ntsonto, 2005; Fanadzo et al., 
2010; Mnkeni et al., 2010; Dlamini, 2013; Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). The low performance 
among SISs and the subsistence basis of their operation prevent irrigators from increasing their 
productivity and cash income (Ntsonto, 2005). So far, smallholder irrigation in SA has made 
relatively low economic contributions (Ibid.). Typically, this poor performance of SISs has 
been associated with several factors such as unfair land distribution, poor maintenance of 
infrastructure and equipment, high energy costs where pumping was involved, lack of 
institutional support in terms of credit, low returns to production, lack of extension and farmer 
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training, lack of technical knowledge, high dependency on government, conflicts, poor 
operational and management processes, weak local organization, etc (Biswas & Tortajada, 
2010; Fanadzo et al., 2010; Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Muchara et al., 2014; Fanadzo & 
Ncube, 2018). 
Policy makers and the government believe that increasing the number of SISs and revitalising 
existing and abandoned schemes, can increase food output, reduce poverty within the rural 
communities and improve the performance of SISs (Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Fanadzo & 
Ncube, 2018). As a result, the SA government invested approximately two billion Rands in 
establishing, revitalising and rehabilitating SISs (Ntsonto, 2005; Denison & Manona, 2007; 
Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Fanadzo, 2012, Mvelase, 2016). Despite considerable government 
investments, the performance of SISs is claimed to be below potentials, indicating that the key 
root of poor performance could be weak institutional arrangements as this aspect in irrigation 
schemes is often overlooked. Jonckheere & Liversage (2017) argued that technology 
improvements alone are not enough to ensure productivity improvements and sustainability of 
irrigation schemes, rather appropriate institutions and property rights accompanying technical 
improvements are necessary for better performance and sustainability of SISs. Bromely (1992) 
cited by Wang (2011) argued that apart from increasing water scarcity, the absence of effective 
management regimes was the real cause of poor SISs performance. Fanadzo (2012) attributed 
the underperformance of SISs to both weak institutional and organizational arrangements and 
poor technical skills. According to Denison & Manona (2007), budget allocations for training, 
management and institutional development constitute a considerable share of the total 
intervention budget, approximately between 40–50%. Mnkeni et al. (2010) inferred that poor 
institutional arrangements and management in SISs make them dysfunctional. Hence, there is 
a great need for balancing the soft and hard component of an irrigation system to ensure 
sustainability (Fanadzo, 2010). This study dwells on the soft component. 
Inequitable distribution of land and other productive resources across intergenerational and 
gender dimensions have also been noted in most African countries, which could also lead to 
the underperformance of SISs. Customary laws in most African countries restrict land 
ownership and inheritance by women (Mabundza et al., 2014). Also, the African norms of land 
inheritance often favour males, as it is only the sons who have better chances of inheriting land 
when the parents die (Dushimimana, 2007; Kosec et al., 2017). Women cannot access land on 
their own and can only access it via male kin (Mabundza et al., 2014). Even when a woman is 
the main farmer in the household, it is seldom that the land cultivated is registered under the 
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women's names (Mnkeni et al., 2010). This makes it difficult for women to acquire land and 
engage in farming. 
Although youth do not seem to be interested in agricultural activities, lack of access to 
agricultural land is one of the major factors influencing their migration to urban areas for high-
return non-agricultural activities (Kosec et al., 2017). Generally, youth often acquire land 
through inheritance, given as a gift, borrowing from neighbours or informal rental markets, and 
do not hold land rights to where they cultivate. The absence of land markets in rural Africa also 
contributes to the difficulty in land accessibility by young people and landless households 
(Kosec et al., 2017).  
The interaction between intergenerational and gender dimensions with water governance in 
communal irrigation schemes seem to be very weak. Water governance at communal level is 
gender-blind (Cleaver & Hamada, 2010). Women are often not recognized as independent 
farmers or irrigators; thus, they remain largely excluded from participating in decision-making 
processes in water resource management and governance such that their access to and control 
over water resources are limited (Cleaver & Hamada, 2010; Njie, 2013). This unequal 
treatment and opportunities across gender could largely be attributed to the lack of land rights 
by women (Mjoli et al., 2009). The rights and entitlements of resources may shape the ways in 
which women participate in mechanisms of water access such as in community water 
committees and how their voices are heard at the local level (Cleaver & Hamada, 2010). 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
The main objective of the study is to assess the effects of the interaction between governance, 
on one hand, and intergenerational and gender dimensions, on the other, on the performance of 
SIS in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The specific objectives were: 
❖ To describe the institutional arrangements for water management in SISs, 
❖ To identify the determinants of farmer awareness of water governance dimensions 
across intergenerational and gender dimensions in SISs, and 
❖ To investigate the effects of governance on cropland allocation in SISs.  
 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
 
The study will be guided by the following hypothesis: 
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H1: The study irrigation schemes have no institutional and organisational arrangements for 
water management; 
H2: Awareness of governance between youth relative to elderly and women relative to men is 
asymmetric;  
H3: Age and gender of an irrigator does not determine farmer awareness of water governance 
dimensions; and 
H4: Water governance has no effect on cropland allocation. 
1.5 The Significance and Explication of Contribution of the Study 
 
Despite the worldwide water scarcity due to high demand of water resources from various 
sectors relative to its supply, irrigation remains central to agricultural production (Johansson, 
2016; Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). The evidence indicates that smallholder irrigation farming has 
a long history although it has not yet succeeded in achieving the objectives for its establishment 
(poverty alleviation and food security) (Sinyolo et al., 2014). In communal areas, irrigated 
farming has been practised traditionally. Farmers used rivers as source of water for irrigating 
crops for subsistence (Ntsonto, 2005). Although traditional councils allocated plots on 
irrigation schemes (Cousin, 2012), yet it is unfortunate that farmers within traditional systems 
do not get equal representation and opportunities in terms of gender and age, especially when 
it comes to resource accessibility. For example, women can only access land through male 
relatives while youth usually acquire land through inheritance (Kosec et al., 2017). In some 
countries like Ethiopia, women and youth are not allowed to participate in discussions of land-
related matters and decision-making forums, while their level of literacy and access to 
information are relatively low (Sida, 2003). Such scenarios are likely to result in divergence in 
the awareness of and the effects of governance dimensions across gender and intergenerational 
dimensions. 
This study argues that the persistent unsatisfactory performance by SISs is institutionally 
related. It is therefore important to examine the effects of the interactions between governance, 
intergenerational and gender dimensions on SISs as this will give an insight as to how water 
governance dimensions affect their operation and viability. The study findings will be to the 
benefit of society since water resources play a vital role in irrigated agriculture and in the 
livelihoods of rural households. Furthermore, understanding the effects of the interactions 
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between governance, intergenerational and gender dimensions on SISs could also help the 
government in policy interventions aimed at developing SISs. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is structured in six chapters. The first chapter is the introductory chapter providing 
the introduction and background information about the study, the problem statement, the study 
objectives and the research hypothesis. In the second chapter, the relevant concepts and theories 
are briefly explained, and previous studies conducted in SISs in similar issues are reviewed and 
presented. The third chapter elaborates on the assessment of the institutional and organisational 
arrangements of water management in SISs. Chapter four looks at the determinants of farmer 
awareness of water governance dimensions across intergenerational and gender dimensions in 
SISs. While the fifth chapter dwells on the investigation of the effects of governance on 
cropland allocation decisions in SISs. Concluding remarks, the study recommendations and 
highlights areas for future research are presented in chapter six. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter is a review of literature from prior studies conducted in SISs. It provides an 
overview of SISs in SA, their performance and the challenges they face. It reviews water 
governance dimensions in SISs, gender and intergenerational involvement in irrigated 
agriculture as well as issues regarding resource distribution across women and youth.  
2.2 An Overview of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes in South Africa 
 
Smallholder irrigation schemes are generally defined based on their water diversion and 
irrigation systems. According to Gomo (2012: 3), smallholder irrigation involves the diversion 
of water from a natural source into a relatively small area for a purpose of supplementing 
available water for crops. Smallholder irrigators divert water using gravity-fed canals, pipes, 
weirs or water pumps for application in the fields through various irrigation methods (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of United Nations (FAO), 2001). Denison & Manona (2007); 
Van Averbeke et al. (2011) and Fanadzo (2012) defined SIS as an irrigation scheme developed 
in the former homelands specifically for disadvantaged farmers in a resource-deprived area. 
Smallholders are often located in the former homelands and usually operate in relatively small 
plots (less than 5 ha). In addition, Van Averbeke (2008) and Fanadzo (2012) categorized 
smallholder irrigators into four groups, namely, farmers on irrigation schemes; independent 
irrigation farmers; community gardeners; and home gardeners. This study focuses on farmers 
on irrigation schemes. 
In SA, SISs were developed during the colonial era in the 19th century with an intention to 
provide rural families with a livelihood from farming (Van Averbeke, 2008). All SISs 
developed during this era were canal schemes, however, the level of irrigation technology has 
improved throughout the years and became complex and costly. This was reflected by a shift 
from the use of canals towards different forms of water and labour-saving overhead irrigation 
systems, which continued until the democratization of the country (Muchara, 2014). In 1997, 
Backeberg and colleagues reported that about 54.4, 32.8 and 11.8 percent of the total irrigated 
land in SA used sprinkler, flood and micro-irrigation technology, respectively (Backeberge, 
1997). The numbers increased, Fanadzo & Ncube (2018) reported 170, 101 and 25 known SISs 
that use overhead, flood and micro-irrigation technology, respectively. Among the irrigation 
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technologies used, micro-irrigation had the highest technical efficiency levels, followed by the 
sprinkler, while flood irrigation had the lowest (Backeberg, 1997). 
Since the establishment of SISs, irrigation management had been the primary responsibility of 
government or its agencies until the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) era in the late 
1990s. During the IMT era the irrigation management, operational and maintenance 
responsibility was transferred from the state to farmers in a manner that maximizes the chances 
of self-sustainability and growth (Van Averbeke, 2008). The process entails transferring water 
rights from being state-owned to market-oriented water rights (tradeable), withdrawal of 
government support from SISs, etc (Backeberge, 1997). According to Backeberge (1997); Shah 
et al. (2002) and Machete et al. (2004), IMT was initiated as a strategy to improve scheme 
management performance, increase the profitability of irrigated agriculture, increase 
accountability of water users, encourage farmers to take responsibility for water resource 
management with limited government assistance, to improve farmer willingness to pay for the 
operation and maintenance costs and mostly to reduce recurrent public spending on operation 
and maintenance of the schemes.  
Currently, SISs are under local responsibility, they are managed and operated by farmers. 
However, farmer-managed SISs showed weak regulatory and water management instruments, 
poor rule enforcement mechanisms, lack secured property rights and lack reliable water supply 
(Muchara, 2014). As such, some irrigation schemes collapsed, while others faced management 
and sustainability challenge, especially the large schemes with modern irrigation technology 
as they incur high infrastructure maintenance costs (Van Averbeke, 2011). The Tomlinson 
Commission (1955) cited by Van Averbeke (2012) reported that state-owned irrigation 
schemes performed better than farmer-owned irrigation schemes. This is because the state 
imposed the institutional arrangements regulating the allocation of water to farmers and land 
use, including choice of crops, and the provision of technical advice and marketing assistance 
for the crops that were prescribed to farmers. Farmers experienced several challenges in 
accessing essential services (such as inputs, credit, output market, etc) but the major challenges 
were high costs due to mechanization, high electricity costs and the repair of the breakdown of 
the old pumps.  
Van Averbeke et al. (2011) counted 302 SISs in SA with 206 (68%) operational, 90 (30%) 
non-operational and 6 (2%) missing schemes. Table 1 provides a summary of SISs, both 
functional and dysfunctional in SA. Among the non-operational, irrigation schemes using 
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overhead irrigation technology constituted the largest proportion (59%) because the irrigation 
infrastructure was complex and costly to manage (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). 
Table 1. Smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa by province 
Province  Total SISs in 
SA 
Number of 
operational 
schemes 
Number of non-
operational 
schemes 
Number of 
unknown 
schemes 
Limpopo 170 101 69 0 
Mpumalanga 9 7 2 0 
North West 2 2 0 0 
KwaZulu-Natal 36 35 0 1 
Free State 2 1 1 0 
Northern cape 3 2 1 0 
Eastern Cape 72 51 16 5 
Western Cape 8 7 1 0 
Total 302 206 90 6 
Source: Van Averbeke et al. (2011); Fanadzo & Ncube (2018) 
 
2.3 Challenges Faced by Smallholder Irrigation Schemes 
 
Smallholder farmers experience several challenges limiting them from performing at 
satisfactory levels. Common challenges faced include insecure land tenure, lack of farmer 
training and extension support services, lack of access to credit, lack of access to markets, lack 
of financial resources, collective management of resources, etc (Mudau, 2010; Van Averbeke 
et al., 2011; Muchara, 2014; Muchara et al., 2014; Mvelase, 2016). The government managed 
to address technical challenges by investing in the revitalization of SISs, upgrading irrigation 
infrastructure and improving resource management techniques. Efforts have also been made to 
address the other challenges, although they have not been successful. Farmers have not reached 
their target production and income. The next paragraphs elaborate on these challenges. 
Insecure land tenure: Although smallholder farmers can access agricultural land from 
traditional authorities, they are not granted exclusive land rights, only the Permission to Occupy 
(PTO) certificate (Mudau, 2010; Veldwisch, 2013; Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). Farmers who 
occupy leased land live in fear that they might not be allocated similar plots when the lease 
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agreement expires (Cousins, 2012). According to Shah et al. (2002) and Mvelase (2016), land 
rights are one of the major constraints in the performance of farmers in their plots and 
management practices they adopt. With insecure land tenure status, it is impossible for farmers 
to make long term investments in their plots and to use the plot held as a source of collateral to 
secure credit from formal institutions (Shah et al., 2002).  
Access to credit: Access to credit is imperative for farmers with insufficient finances as it 
enables them to purchase necessary inputs and to make an investment in technologies that can 
improve their productivity (Bembridge, 2000). However, due to their inability to use their 
allocated land as collateral which comes in the form of land rights that most farmers do not 
possess, they are not granted credit (Machete et al., 2004). Financial institutions perceive 
smallholder farmers to be associated with high risk and give first preference to large-scale 
farmers (Mvelase, 2016). 
Marketing issues: Market access has been recognized as the main driving force of agricultural 
commercialization and one of the drivers of successful smallholder farming (Magingxa et al., 
2006). Farmers in SISs find it difficult to secure a contract with reliable and stable markets 
where they can sell their fresh produce due to low bargaining power, high transaction costs, 
poor linkages to important inputs and output markets, etc (Mvelase, 2016). As a result, 
smallholder farmers have limited opportunity to earn more from their sales and to create 
opportunities for rural employment.  
 
Training and Extension support services: Extension advisory and agricultural support 
services can have a large impact on productivity improvement and development of SISs 
(Fanadzo et al., 2012). However, capacity building and farmer training in scheme management 
have been the missing links in SA, and failure of many SISs have been attributed to lack of 
adequately trained farmers and extension staff (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). Most farmers in SISs 
are not well informed with recent land preparation, crop production techniques, irrigation 
scheduling, and water management as well as with technical matters pertaining to irrigation 
infrastructure (Mvelase, 2016). They still rely on indigenous knowledge (Muchara, 2014). The 
Department of Agriculture (2005) cited in Fanadzo & Ncube (2018) reported the ratio of 
extension from the neighbouring countries as India (1:1000), Zambia (1:800) and Zimbabwe 
(1:700) indicating that the available extension officers are too little for the smallholders. 
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Collective management of resources: The joint management of communal resources such as 
irrigation water and irrigation infrastructure are challenging tasks for most smallholder 
irrigators and a primary source of conflicts among irrigators within the scheme. The absence 
of property right makes it difficult to exclude nonscheme members from utilizing the scheme 
water (Muchara, 2004). This is a common issue in irrigation schemes since households are 
located along the river or the canal. For example, the quantity or the quality of water for 
downstream users can be affected by the activities of upstream users (Faysse, 2004). 
 
2.4 Water Governance Dimensions for Irrigated Agriculture in South Africa 
 
Many researchers view the concept of water governance differently. Shah et al. (2015) defined 
water governance as an interplay between water laws, policies and institutions affecting water 
economy. It is also concerned with the processes involved in formulating and enforcing rules 
in the water sector. Van Koppen (2002) defined institutions as the collective arrangements 
governing the construction and operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, water 
distribution and resource mobilization can be formal or informal. While formal institutions are 
written laws, rules and procedures, informal institutions are established procedures, norms, 
practices and patterns of behaviour; they may be created or evolve over time (North, 1990; 
Nhundu, 2013).  Institutions affecting irrigation are not only those directly managing it. There 
are other governance aspects such as political, economic, organizational structures and social 
interactions and are considered as not mutually exclusive (Bandaragoda & Firdousi, 1992; 
Nhundu, 2013). According to Lestoalo & Van Averbeke (2006), institutional inefficiencies and 
weaknesses lead to shortages, inequitable distribution of water and negatively impact on the 
maintenance of infrastructure. The limited availability of land and water resources increase the 
need for clearly defined property rights and institutions on how these resources are distributed 
and used productively, as it is widely known that property rights provide an incentive for 
efficient use of scarce resources (Jonckheere & Liversage, 2017). The existing SA legal 
understanding of water use and the ownership of land, without access to land, individuals 
cannot access irrigation water (Tsur, 2010).  
 
2.4.1 Formal institutions 
 
Water resource in SA is regulated by water legislation accompanied by government strategies 
to ensure that the aims of the central water law are achieved, as well as the informal rules and 
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regulations at the local level (Visser, 2015). Its allocation is through authorization (licensing 
and registration) to avoid and control the risks of unsustainability in its management (Namara 
et al., 2010). Water sector has been undergoing several transitions since the apartheid 
government to a democratic government (Perret, 2002). Following the democratization of SA 
in 1994, the government abolished water laws established during the apartheid era and adopted 
new water policies, strategies, programmes and organizational structures to address the 
imbalances of the past (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018). The Irrigation and Water Conservation Act 
(Act 8 of 1912) and Water Act (Act 54 of 1956) were abolished because they served the 
interests of the white minority and resulted in commercial white farmers having unconstrained 
water access (Perret, 2002; Tewari, 2009).  Among the newly established water legislation were 
the National Water Act (1998), National Water Resources Strategy (2013), Water Allocation 
Reform (2006), Irrigation Strategy (2015), Catchment Management Agency and Water Users 
Association along with informal rules and cultural norms at the local level.  
 
2.4.1.1 Water policies and laws 
 
National Water Policy (1997): The National Water Policy treats water as an economic good, 
and for the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of SA's water 
resources (Karodia & Weston, 2001). This policy redefined the ownership and allocation of 
water and affirms that all water is public water and that the national government will act as a 
public trustee (Folifac, 2007).        
National Water Act (NWA) (Act 36 of 1998): The NWA was developed and implemented to 
ensure that SA’s water resources were protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and 
controlled. The Act has three key principles; sustainability, equity and efficiency, guiding the 
protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources 
(Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1998). The sustainability principle promotes social and 
economic development and ensures that the environment is protected for future use. The equity 
principle ensures that everyone has equitable access to water, and the water allocation decisions 
are fair to all people. While the efficiency principle ensures that water used is not to be wasted. 
To achieve the aims of NWA, the Act created two user-driven water resource management 
organizations, which is, the catchment management agency at catchment level and water user’s 
association at the local level and allowed users to participate in decision making by 
decentralization water management to catchment and local levels. Backeberg (1997) also 
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indicated that participation of water users in water management can be achieved by establishing 
organizations representing their interest on a local level. The NWA authorizes smallholder 
farmers to abstract water for irrigation without registration, licencing or payment as stipulated 
in Schedule 1 of the Act (Perret, 2002). The National Water Policy requires water users to join 
water user’s associations, to register as water users through licencing, to apply for water rights 
and pay application and user fees (Sokile et al., 2005).  
2.4.1.2 Strategies for water and irrigation 
 
National Water Resource Strategy 2 (2013): The second edition of Natural Water Resource 
Strategy (NWRS) established in 2014 describes how water resources will be used and protected 
according to the requirements of existing policies and laws (Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF), 2004). While the second edition implemented in 2013 provides a framework 
for the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources 
for the country. The NWRS2 sets out the strategies to plan, develop, manage, protect and 
control the use of the nation’s water resources effectively for the future (Department of Water 
Affairs (DWA), 2013). The NWRS2 responds to the priorities set by the government within 
the National Development Plan (NDP) and the NWA for sustainable development. The NDP 
and NWA collectively embarked towards equitable water allocation to redress the past racial 
imbalances. The SA constitution states that water resource is a basic human need for the current 
and future generation (RSA, 1998). Hence, equitable access to water resources is imperative 
for poverty alleviation and the promotion of equitable and sustainable growth. According to 
DWA (2013), equity and redistribution can be achieved through the authorisation process and 
other mechanisms such as Water Allocation Reform (WAR) programme which was developed 
to ensure that the main objectives of the NWRS are all met. 
Irrigation Strategy: The Irrigation water strategy for SA was informed by the NDP and the 
NWRS2. The strategy was developed as a response to the call for the agricultural sector to 
increase its contribution to agricultural production thus ensuring food security, poverty 
alleviation and job creation (DAFF, 2015). It seeks to support irrigation initiatives based on the 
revitalisation of irrigation schemes, development of new irrigation schemes, as well as 
management and efficient use of water for irrigation purposes. The irrigation strategy had 
several objectives such as increasing the contribution of irrigated agriculture to the GDP (at 
least in absolute terms), poverty alleviation, creation of employment and skills development; 
increase equitable access to irrigated agriculture by historically disadvantaged individuals 
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(HDIs), especially commercial irrigated agriculture, without compromising irrigation water use 
efficiency in the process and to optimize irrigation water use efficiency with a view to long-
term sustainability of irrigated agriculture (DAFF, 2015). 
2.4.1.3 Government programmes 
 
Some of the programmes included revitalisation of smallholder irrigation schemes 
programmes, WAR and the land reform (Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018).  
The Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS): The RESIS programme 
was developed in 1998 to improve agricultural productivity on the schemes; to enable the 
schemes to play a role in local economic development through improved incomes for 
beneficiaries, and to improve food security (Maepa et al., 2014). To achieve these objectives, 
the RESIS programme revitalizes selected smallholder irrigation schemes with outdated 
irrigation technologies/ infrastructure in Limpopo province (Veldwisch, 2013; Maepa et al., 
2014). Under the RESIS programme in (1998 – 2001) in Limpopo, the scheme infrastructure 
was rehabilitated, irrigators were provided training on field and system water management and 
the management of the scheme was handed over to the water users association (Veldwisch, 
2013). Moreover, the RESIS programme had positive outcomes at the Thabina irrigation 
scheme. After the revitalisation of the scheme, the Management Committee (MC) became the 
legal management body, water availability was significantly increased, and the yields were 
significantly increased (Veldwisch, 2013). 
Land Reform: The distribution of water resources in SA had been extremely unequal across 
different racial groups with whites accounting for only 0.5% of the total population yet 
controlling at least 95% of the water resources (Van Koppen, 2008). The Africans had been 
historically disadvantaged not only in the water sector but also with regards to land ownership. 
The HDIs did not have water entitlement in their names. According to Van Koppen (2008: 
433), “the Land Act of 1913 ‘lawfully’ dispossessed Africans of 91% of their land, slightly 
limiting to 87% under the Land Act of 1936”. As such, a large proportion (87%) of the total 
available land was controlled and owned by the White minority. Furthermore, land 
dispossession aggravated the situation even further, causing a highly unequal pattern of land 
ownership and widespread rural poverty in SA (Jacobs et al., 2003). In 1998, Oettle and 
colleagues reported that the white minority (60 000 white commercial farmers) occupied about 
102 million ha while the black majority (1.2 million black farmers) occupied only 17 million 
ha of agricultural land (Moswetsi et al., 2017). This reflects racial imbalances in land 
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distribution. According to Links (2011), these imbalances are not new, by 1958 there was 
already a need for land reform in SA as the Black people were not given equal opportunities as 
white people and therefore were forced off farmland and properties. 
Following democratization of the country, the SA government implemented the land reform 
programme which constitutes three dimensions: redistribution, restitution and land tenure 
reform (Cliffe, 2000).  According to Jacobs et al. (2003: 1) and Cliffe (2000: 274 – 275), land 
restitution deals specifically with historical rights in land. aims to restore to those dispossessed 
of their rights in the land since 1913 through racially discriminatory laws and practice.  Land 
tenure reform with forms of landholding. It seeks to address issues pertaining to insecure, 
overlapping and disputed land rights resulting from the previous systems of governance, 
especially in the former Bantustans. Land redistribution is specifically aimed at transforming 
the racial pattern of land ownership. The key target was to redistribute 30% of white-owned 
commercial farmland by 2014 (Links, 2011).   
The overall status of the land reform programme in SA is considered as slow and not meeting 
government targets (Links, 2011). The total number of beneficiaries from the land 
redistribution has been increasing from 1994 (1 004) up to 2000 (34 768) and most land 
transfers occurred in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal province (Jacobs et al., 2003).  In 
2001 and 2002 the numbers declined. Links (2011) reported that only 5% of the land was 
redistributed by 2008. According to Links (2011), less than 2% of SA farmland was 
redistributed by 1999 and only 7 % of the land out of 30% has been transferred and redistributed 
to 2011. With regards to land restitution, only a few claims had been successfully resolved by 
2000 (Cliffe, 2000). The tenure reform process was complex and slow. In 2013 about 1556 
cases were resolved while in 2009 the number declined to 405 (Links, 2011). 
Water Allocation Reform: The DWA established the WAR to redress past imbalances (racial 
and gender) in the allocation of water. It reallocates water from the advantaged to economically 
disadvantaged individuals, regardless of the linkage between water and land. The WAR 
programme aims to take steps to meet the water needs of HDIs and the poor, ensure 
participation by these groups in water resource management, promote the sustainable use of 
water resources, and promote the beneficial and efficient use of water in the public interest. 
However, the WAR programme has not covered its entire scope, for example, the compulsory 
licensing has not been widely implemented. 
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2.4.1.4 Organizational structures 
 
Catchment Management Agency (CMA): CMAs are regional water management institutions 
established to manage water resources at catchment level as well as to perform the key 
responsibilities of NWA at catchment level. According to Karodia & Weston (2001: 16), the 
key functions of the CMA included playing a coordinating role regarding water-related 
activities and water management institutions; developing and implementing a Catchment 
Management Strategy; and encouraging public participation. In SA, the implementation of 
CMA has not been successful. Bourblanc & Blanchon (2014) reported that there were only two 
CMAs that had been established, among reasons that contribute to the failure of CMAs include 
poor administration, mismanagement, lack of training of newly appointed public servants or 
coordination problems. 
Water Users Association (WUA): WUAs are local water management institutions established 
to enable people within a community to pool their resources to carry out water-related activities 
more effectively as well as to take over irrigation management functions such as water 
allocation and distribution, water charging system, irrigation maintenance, financial 
management, and redressing racial imbalances of the past created by Irrigation Boards and the 
individual rights principle. (Karodia & Weston, 2001; Perret, 2006). The significance of WUAs 
in improving water management, conflict resolution, improved fee collection, enhanced land 
productivity and resulting in better operation and management have been recognized in Africa 
(Shah et al., 2002). However, the establishment of WUAs in SA has relatively slow. According 
to Saruchera (2008), all WUAs in SA were supposed to be formed by 2006, all irrigators had 
to join WUAs and the membership was meant to be compulsory. Still, the adoption of WUAs 
is very poor because its role has never been conceptualized nor fully defined to smallholder 
irrigators from the onset, lack of legal water rights among smallholder irrigators was another 
reason for not participating in WUAs. 
2.4.2 Informal institutions 
 
The behaviour and actions of farmers towards land and water resources cannot only be 
determined by the statutory rules and procedures, but also informal rules, customs and 
traditional practices play an important role in governing organizational and social behaviour 
(Bandaragoda & Firdousi, 1992). Farmers at scheme level tend to devise their own rules, 
procedures and regulations from statutory laws that best represent their interest such as local 
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norms, customary laws and religious laws (Namara et al., 2010).  Local norms play a significant 
role in ensuring equitable access to water for both domestic and production purposes among 
all persons in the area. Although informal rules have similar intentions (equity and sustainable 
management of water resources) and resolutions in water management as statutory laws, they 
tend to be unnoticed by official policies and intervention strategies (Namara et al., 2010). 
Irrigators in irrigation schemes elect the scheme committee which acts as water management 
institution and oversees all the irrigation management activities in the scheme (Bandaragoda 
& Firdousi, 1992). As for water management, most irrigation schemes develop an irrigation 
arrangement whereby all irrigators have an equal chance to access irrigation water. Rotational 
irrigation is often practised when water stresses are high and to ensure that all farmers may 
receive enough water to irrigate their fields and it was recognised as a successful case of 
formalized informal arrangement for water management (Sokile et al., 2005; Deribe, 2008). 
Although both formal and informal water institutions are equally important in managing water 
at scheme level, informal institutional arrangements (customary institutions) and local 
institutions tend to be more valuable, influential and powerful compared to formal institutions 
due to low diffusion of the state laws and irrigators have an incentive to follow and enforce 
rules formulated by themselves than those handed down from an outside authority (Tang & 
Ostrom, 1993; Sokile et al., 2005; Deribe 2008). According to Bandaragoda & Firdousi (1992), 
informal institutions attract greater compliance from individuals and groups because they seem 
to be more relevant to the needs of the locals.  
2.5 Youth in Irrigated Agriculture 
 
Youth is regarded as the basic resource of the country, the future of the agricultural sector and 
the most productive proportion of the total labour force (Mousaei & Arayesh, 2011). Yet, their 
involvement in the agricultural sector is disappointing and has been as declining over the past 
few years, let alone participation in SISs (Cheteni, 2017). This makes the future of agriculture 
looks uninviting as it is dominated by aged subsistence farmers. According to the National 
Youth Commission Act (1996) and the National Youth Policy (2000) cited by Mkra (2014), 
youth refers to young people who fall between the age-range of 14 to 35. Like in other 
developing countries, youth make the largest proportion (36.03%) of the total SA population 
(Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), 2017), yet they are reluctant to engage in agricultural 
activities and considering agriculture as their main careers. People in Centane rural community 
believe that government is not doing enough in providing support to stimulate youth 
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involvement in agriculture, national policies as well do not make agriculture attractive to the 
youth. Stakeholders from relevant government departments also acknowledged that the 
government was not providing sufficient support to encourage youth’s involvement in 
agriculture (Mkra, 2014).   
In the Eastern Cape Province, Mkra (2014) reported that the reluctance of youth to participate 
in agriculture was due to the following reasons: 
i) young people lack encouragement and motivation from the people that do take farming 
seriously; 
ii)  youth believe that agriculture is time-consuming;  
iii) youth are lazy, and they do not want to pursue things on their own, they expect the 
government to hand them things that are of benefit to them; 
iv)  they have a negative perception about agriculture and still view it as working on farm 
physically;  
v) some believe that the agricultural sector is for the elderly, illiterates or people with 
nothing to do; and 
vi)  the youth want money, they want to do work that will provide them with a salary at 
the end of the month.  
Some believe that agriculture is a low-status job associated with low wages. Hence, they tend 
to migrate to urban areas in search of better-paying jobs that will guarantee finances at the end 
of the month and as an alternative source of livelihood (Cheteni, 2017).  Samardick et al. 
(2000) believe that local youth have low self-esteem which increases the negative perception 
about agriculture and thus, leads to non-participation.  
It is also important to note that it is not always the negative perceptions of agriculture that 
impedes youth’s participation in agriculture. Adekunle (2009) pointed out inadequate credit 
facility, lack of agricultural insurance, poor returns to agricultural investment, lack of basic 
farming knowledge and lack of access to farm inputs as some of the major constraints hindering 
youth participation in agriculture in Nigeria. In SA and Ethiopia, lack of access to productive 
land is a major limitation to the participation of youth in agriculture since land is not readily 
available for young people. Youth generally acquire land through inheritance, gift or borrowing 
from neighbours or informal rental markets, they do not hold land rights for the piece of land 
they are cultivating. The absence of land markets in rural Africa also contributes to difficulties 
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in land accessibility by young people and landless households (Kosec et al., 2017). This results 
in youth migration to urban areas for high-return non-agricultural activities (Ibid.).  
2.6 Gender distribution in Irrigated Agriculture 
 
In agriculture, gender is often associated with women. Sociologists define gender as the roles 
and expectations attributed to men and women in a given society, and these roles can change 
over time and life stage (Phillips, 2005). Phillips (2005) also differentiated gender from sex, 
which is the biological difference between females and males. This study refers gender to 
women and men.  According to Gender and Water Alliance (GWA) (2003), the effects of water 
scarcity differs across gender dimensions, and this could be associated with gender imbalances 
that have been noted in developing countries (Denison & Manona, 2007). Previous work done 
by the World Bank in Kenya revealed that women contributed approximately 80% labour to 
food production, managed 40% of smallholder farms, yet they held less than 10% of the 
registered titles, receive less than 10% agricultural credit and 5% agricultural extension 
services globally (Njie, 2013). In addition, women are also regarded as primary users of water 
resources, for both domestic and agricultural purposes. However, their participation in water 
management, decision-making positions and participation in scheme leadership is limited 
(Were et al., 2008; Diiro et al., 2018). Similarly, the membership of women in WUAs has been 
found to be limited in developing countries. In Kyrgyzstan, only 18% of women were recorded 
as WUA members in 2009 (Nixon, 2017). Were et al. (2008) attributed this to socioeconomic 
and governance factors. In rural areas, cultural/social norms play a significant role in dictating 
gender roles in society and often prevent women from participating in community 
organizations (Nixon, 2017). For example, men traditionally engage in public and community 
activities, while women are expected to do homestead activities and working as unpaid labour 
in their husband’s land, (Panda, 2007; Were et al., 2008).  
Among the initiatives established to redress gender imbalances in the water sector, GWA was 
also established for similar purposes. It looks at whether the implemented water legislation, 
policies and programmes respond to gender messages (GWA, 2003). The literature argues that 
inclusion of women in resource governance promotes gender equity, reduces high dependency 
on men and improves their status in the community and households as decision makers (Nixon, 
2017). The SA government through the equity principle in the NWA recognizes the importance 
of women’s voices in water management structures. It is believed that fair distribution of 
resources and equal participation of women in water management and giving them a voice in 
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decisions on use and allocation of water resources could improve their status (Mjoli et al., 
2009). Moreover, the involvement of women in water resource development has been 
recognised as having the potential to lead to designing effective new solutions to water 
problems; making irrigation schemes more sustainable; ensuring that infrastructure 
development yields the maximum social and economic returns; etc (Panda, 2007). For example, 
after changing the structure of the water committee in Malawi and Philippines to electing at 
least 60% women in the committee, the management of water points improved significantly. 
Irrigation bills were paid on time, meetings were held consistently, membership and attendance 
also improved.  
The SA land reform prioritises racial inequalities in land ownership as the main source of 
inequity while giving minor attention to gender and generational dynamics (Nyamwanza, 
2017). The African norms of land inheritance also favour males, as it is only the sons who have 
stronger chances of inheriting land when the parents pass on (Dushimimana, 2007; Kosec et 
al., 2017). Women and daughters cannot access land on their own, they depend on their 
husbands and male kins (Arends, 2009). Under customary law, the land is generally allocated 
to men, the household heads. The intentions of the country NDP (2012) to create one million 
jobs by 2030 through agriculture cannot be met if youth land rights are not enhanced 
(Nyamwanza, 2017). The land restitution of the land reform programme is the only government 
programme that can assist youth to obtain beneficiary control and ownership of land for 
farming and agricultural purposes as its arguments for enhancing youth land rights 
(Nyamwanza, 2017). 
2.7 Land Utilization in Winter Season 
 
The severity of water scarcity has negative implications for cropland utilization. In countries 
like West Bengal and coastal Bangladesh characterised by dry winter seasons, they often fallow 
their land due to the inadequate water supply for cropping (Krupnik et al., 2017). This was also 
evident in SISs in Limpopo where Van Koppen et al. (2017) reported high non-utilisation of 
SISs in winter. Of the study irrigation schemes, 36% were found to be fully utilized during the 
2015 winter irrigation season, 36% were not utilized and the utilization of 29% schemes was 
low or moderate. Among the irrigated land equipped with centre pivots about 69% of the area 
was not used. In the study conducted in Zanyokwe irrigation scheme, it was found that not all 
irrigators cultivated all their plots during the winter season. About 24% irrigator who utilised 
their total land holding while the rest partially cultivated their land. Interestingly, no single 
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irrigator left their land idle (Tshuma & Monde, 2012). This was a major improvement on the 
level of land use in the scheme brought by the Best Management Practices Project. According 
to Van Koppen et al. (2017), some causes of poor status of infrastructure and low utilization 
are associated with institutional and social issues such as land tenure security, scheme 
management practices (water distribution, maintenance, etc) and intra-household and intra-
community relations. While, irrigators pointed out that water infrastructure and water 
availability were the key limitations for full utilization of irrigated land followed by the lack of 
implements for land preparation (Van Koppen et al., 2017).  
2.8 Summary 
 
The SA government established SISs during the colonial era to alleviate poverty and improve 
food security in rural families through irrigated agriculture. However, there has been 
widespread concern about the poor performance of SISs partly because of the common 
challenges facing smallholder farmers with poor governance problems and weak institutional 
arrangements being the key ones that have been overlooked. In the late 1990s, the government 
transferred irrigation and scheme management to irrigators with an intention to improve 
smallholder performance, reduce government spending, etc. Financial investments were also 
made in refurbishing irrigation infrastructure with an intention to improve smallholder 
contribution in the SA economy. However, poor performance among SISs is still persistent. 
The government implemented the NWA, NWRS and programmes to ensure that SA’s water 
resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled. Unequal 
representation of gender and intergenerational dimensions in water management and decision-
making positions, and unequal distribution of land resource across the dimensions have been 
noted. This has resulted in discrepancies in resource allocation and utilization and in 
agricultural productivity before taking into account the level of governance understanding. 
Both the statutory land and water policies have not succeeded in addressing these inequalities.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DESCRIPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AND 
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT IN 
SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Abstract 
 
Smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa were established for improving rural 
livelihoods and to alleviate poverty through effective and equitable use of land and water 
resources among rural communities. However, achieving a fair distribution of these resources 
has been challenging in most developing countries due to management challenges. The 
literature points out that smallholder irrigation schemes cannot reach the expected outcomes 
without basic institutional reform for irrigation management. This study applied descriptive 
statistical techniques to describe institutional and organisational arrangements for water 
management in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation schemes in KwaZulu-Natal 
Province, South Africa. The results indicated that irrigation schemes had functional informal 
institutions governing the use and management of water resources. All the schemes had the 
committee facilitating the scheme management activities. Therefore, the study recommends 
that smallholder irrigators in other irrigation schemes should be encouraged to take all the 
scheme matters to their own hands since the smallholder irrigation schemes are in the irrigation 
management transfer era.  
3.1 Introduction  
 
The global decline in water supply has imposed a considerable threat to rural households whose 
livelihood heavily depends on agriculture since water plays a pivotal role in enhanced 
livelihoods and rural development (Patel et al., 2014). Irrigation has, therefore, become an 
alternative to sustain agricultural production due to its direct impacts on improving farmers’ 
livelihood and alleviating poverty (Wang, 2011). The key aims of adopting and establishing 
SISs can be achieved through effective and equitable use of land and water resources among 
rural communities (Dejene et al., 2008). However, achieving a fair distribution of these 
resources presents challenged in most developing countries. For example, in western Oromia, 
Ethiopia there were claims that land ownership, the distribution of farm sizes and irrigation 
water was not fair among irrigators (Dejene et al., 2008). Farmers with higher income levels 
had relatively bigger plots while about 20% irrigators did not own land and could only access 
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it through sharecropping (leasing-in and leasing-out), labour exchange and exchange of oxen 
for land. Management difficulties were also exacerbated by an insecure land tenure which made 
it difficult to clearly know the total amount of irrigable land used by irrigators and thus, to 
adjust water allocation and resource mobilization among irrigators (Dejene et al., 2008). 
Prior to the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), the government developed and imposed 
institutions and organisations governing SISs without the input of farmers and provided them 
with free services (Letsoalo & Van Averbeke, 2005; Mutambara et al., 2014). However, the 
government-managed irrigation schemes experienced various challenges with the management 
of water resources which resulted in inadequate distribution of water, the inadequate allocation 
for operation and maintenance. Irrigators had no incentives to save water. As a result, the 
performance of irrigated agriculture fell below technical and economic potential (Boyer, 2007). 
Studies on water governance in SISs showed that water governance-related services especially 
operating rules, rules enforcement, and sharing responsibilities among members are better 
provided by the irrigators themselves and are more efficient and effective in farmer-managed 
irrigation schemes (World Bank, 1998; Frederiksen & Vissia, 1998; Ostrom, 1992 & 2002; 
Bromley, 1992 cited by Boyer, 2007). Unfortunately, farmers could not manage the scheme on 
their own following decentralization due to lack of financial resources, lack of managerial 
skills, etc. As a result, most irrigation schemes have been declared unsustainable and 
dysfunctional (Letsoalo & Van Averbeke, 2005; Mutambara et al., 2014). Moreover, claims of 
poor management of water resources persist. 
 
 Makombe et al. (1998) pointed out that water management is a common challenge across 
smallholder crop production as farmers often fail to equate water supply and demand and the 
appropriate time of water application. According to Schaible & Aillery (2007), irrigation water 
management is a practice of controlling the use of irrigation water and related inputs to 
maximise economic return from irrigated crop production while minimising environmental 
impacts. It involves scheduling how much water to be abstracted and when to irrigate. Simitu 
& Odira (2007) noted inefficient water resource usage from irrigation as irrigators often apply 
water regardless of crop growth stage and water requirement resulting in overirrigation or under 
irrigation. According to Speelman et al. (2010), the lack of effective water rights systems, water 
charge system and ill-defined property rights are the major sources of low water use efficiency 
and major problems for the water management in SISs around SA. Bromely (1992) cited by 
Wang (2011) argued that water availability is not much of a problem, the real problem is rather 
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the absence of effective management regimes. Samakande et al. (2002) also inferred that SISs 
cannot reach the expected outcomes without basic institutional reform for irrigation 
management.  
 
This study describes institutional and organisational arrangements for water management in 
Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation schemes in KwaZulu-Natal Province, South 
Africa. This chapter is organised as follows: the first section introduced and provided general 
background about the study; the second section outlines the methodology used to achieve the 
objective of this study; the fourth section discusses the key findings while the last section 
summarises the conclusions and provide the study recommendations. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
This section provides the research methods used in this study, briefly explaining the conceptual 
framework, study area, sampling and data collection techniques, data analysis method used in 
this study. 
3.2.1 Conceptual framework 
Irrigation schemes constitute irrigators interacting with the water resource system and 
governance system governing the use and management of the resources. Irrigators within the 
SISs share water resource, irrigation infrastructure and water distribution system to achieve 
individual goals. The fact that irrigation water utilised in irrigation schemes is shared by a 
community of users and its characteristics of non-excludability and subtractability makes it a 
common resource (Boyer, 2007; Wang, 2011; Anaba, 2016). The amount of water used by one 
irrigator is no longer available to other irrigators using the same water resource (Anaba, 2016). 
Moreover, excluding others (non-irrigators) from benefiting from irrigation water is relatively 
difficult and costly since ownership rights are not assigned to anyone (Wang, 2011). This 
makes it challenging to effectively manage irrigation water.  
 
Water governance dimensions (water policy framework, organisations and rules and 
regulations) established from formal or informal structures assist in the management of water 
resources. Irrigators within the scheme interact with the established water institutions to ensure 
that water resources are equitably distributed across the scheme and used in a sustainable 
manner. However, there are sufficient conditions (such as the Ostrom’s eight design principles) 
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essential for effective management of common property resource (CPR). Ostrom (1990) cited 
by Samakande et al. (2002); Muchara (2014) identified eight design principles that can prevent 
over-exploitation and lead to successful self-government of the CPR. These design principles 
have often been used to analyse institutional arrangements in SISs. The institutional design 
principles on an irrigation management deal with the appropriation and provision problems and 
serve as sufficient conditions for fair allocation of the resource (Muchara, 2014). 
 
Ostrom (1990) defined the eight design principles describing the CPR institutions as follows; 
• Clearly defined boundaries: clearly defined boundaries in the form of rights to 
withdraw resource can prevent the depletion of CPR and ensure that benefits from the 
CPR enjoyed by the right holders. 
• Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: 
“appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and quantity of resource units 
are related to local conditions and provide of rules requiring labour, material and/ or 
money” (Samakande et al., 2002: 2). The rules set at different levels should align. 
• Collective choice arrangements: beneficiaries of the CPR users affected by the 
operational rules can participate in amending the operational rules.   
• Monitoring: rule enforcement and appropriate behaviour can be achieved when there 
are monitors who actively audit CPR conditions.  
• Graduated sanctions: users who violate the operational rules should face graduated 
sanctions depending on the seriousness and the context of the offence.  
• Conflict resolution mechanisms: CPR users and their officials have access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflicts (Samakande et al., 2002: 2).   
• Minimal recognition of rights to organize: the external government authorities should 
recognise the rights and institutions devised by CPR user at the local level. 
• Nested enterprises: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises (Samakande et al., 2002: 2).   
The interaction between irrigators and the governance system governing the use of resources 
within the scheme can have either positive or negative outcomes on water management, 
scheme performance or production decisions. However, the effects are not uniform since there 
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is heterogeneity among irrigators with regards to socio-economic attributes and resource 
endowment (Murugani & Thamaga-Chitja, 2018). The linkage between irrigators and 
governance system within irrigation schemes is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Linkage between irrigators and governance system within irrigation schemes 
Source: Muchara (2014) 
 
3.2.2 Study area 
The survey was undertaken in Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS), Tugela Ferry Irrigation 
Scheme (TFIS) in Msinga Local Municipality in Umzinyathi District and Ndumo Irrigation 
Scheme (NIS) in Jozini Local Municipality in Umkhanyakude District. Msinga is largely rural 
areas with 70% of its land being held under traditional authority by Ingonyama trust and 30% 
of the remaining land is commercial farmland (Njoko & Mudhara, 2017). Likewise, a large 
proportion of Jozini area is predominantly rural with 60% of its land held under Ingonyama 
Trust ownership with four tribal authorities which are recognised as custodians of land (Jozini 
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Municipality, 2017). The remaining 40% of Jozini land surrounding the Pongola River is State-
owned (Jozini Municipality, 2017).  
Characteristics of the study irrigation schemes 
MRIS: A farmer-managed irrigation scheme of approximately 600 ha made up of 15 blocks. 
The scheme serves about 850 irrigators. The scheme abstracts water from the Mooi River by 
gravity into a 20.8 km long main canal which further conveys water to the field (Nyiraneza, 
2007; Njoko & Mudhara, 2017). The canal has several gates for different blocks, moreover, 
each block has few channel gates to direct the irrigation water from the main concrete canals 
along ground channels to the farmers' plots (Nyiraneza, 2007). The Mooi River Irrigation 
Scheme was established in the 20th century for improving the livelihood of people residing in 
Muden rather than for income generation (Chirigo, 2014). 
TFIS: A farmer-managed irrigation scheme of approximately 800 ha made up of 7 blocks. The 
scheme serves about 1500 irrigators. The scheme is fed by Tugela River and uses the canal, 
diesel, and electric pumps to convey water to the field. The scheme was constructed in the early 
20th century for improving the welfare of the people residing in the area (Cousin, 2012). 
NIS: A farmer-managed irrigation scheme of approximately 1500 ha made comprising of 
Phase 1 and 2. The scheme serves about 100 irrigators. Farmers in Phase 2 operate as a 
cooperative (Mnothophansi Co-operative), although they work individually. The scheme is fed 
by Pongola River and uses an electric pump to convey water to the field. This is a new irrigation 
scheme established in March 2016. 
Water conveyance system and irrigation technology differ across the schemes implying that 
water supply and accessibility also differ. Therefore, the inclusion of irrigation schemes from 
different parts of KwaZulu-Natal was meant to capture the variation in the availability and 
accessibility of water resources as well as capturing the full diversity of institutional 
arrangements since all these irrigation schemes are farmer-managed. 
3.2.3 Data collection methods and sampling techniques 
Primary data used in this study were collected through focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews and a structured household questionnaire. The household questionnaire was pre-
tested, modified accordingly and administered by trained Zulu-speaking enumerators. To select 
survey respondents, a stratified and systematic random sampling technique was employed, 
where the strata were Blocks within the irrigation schemes. Irrigators were drawn from each 
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block within the scheme since the distance from the main canal differ across the blocks. This 
was done to ensure a sample representative of the population of irrigators. According to 
Cochran (1977) and Singh & Chaudhary (1986), stratified random sampling is the sampling 
technique whereby a sample is randomly drawn from nonoverlapping strata of the population. 
While, systematic sampling is defined as the sampling technique in which only the first unit is 
selected with the help of random numbers and the rest get selected automatically (Singh & 
Chaudhary, 1986: 81). This study combined both systematic and stratified random sampling 
technique because of their advantages. It is easier to draw more precise samples that are easy 
to execute with no mistakes with systematic sampling (Cochran, 1977). Stratification was 
incorporated to ensure adequate representation of various groups of the population (Singh & 
Chaudhary, 1986). A sample of 274 irrigators (11.18% of the population of irrigators) was 
drawn from the three irrigation schemes by selecting every fifth irrigator.  
3.2.4 Analytical framework 
This study, therefore, applied the descriptive statistical method such as frequency, percentage, 
mean, and standard deviation, χ2-statistic, and presented in a table and graphical format, to 
analysed data obtained during household surveys, focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews. The descriptive statistical technique was chosen because of its suitability to 
quantify qualitative responses (Ott & Longnecker, 2001; Pe´rez-Vicentea & Expo´sito Ruizb, 
2009). It is often used to describe any data set and draw a set of conclusions about the 
characteristics of the sample (Ott & Longnecker, 2001; Pe´rez-Vicentea & Expo´sito Ruizb, 
2009). 
 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
 
This section discusses the institutional arrangements in the study irrigation schemes with more 
focus on activities carried out in the management of water resources. These activities include 
water distribution, irrigation infrastructure maintenance, collection of water fees, conflict 
resolution mechanism and stakeholder involvement in the scheme management. 
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Institutional Arrangements in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo Irrigation Schemes 
3.3.1 Water authorization  
Table 2 presents water authorization in the studied irrigation schemes. During focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews and feedback workshops the majority (65.8% and more) 
of irrigators revealed that they did not have legally recognised water rights and licences. Water 
rights were linked to the cultivated plot in the scheme. Without access to land, individuals could 
not access irrigation water. Moreover, farmers in the studied irrigation schemes were not 
paying for water resources but paid for water conveyance such as electricity or diesel for the 
water pump.  
When asked about willingness to pay for water resources all irrigators in NIS indicated strong 
willingness while most irrigators in MRIS and TFIS were not willing to pay (Table 2), they 
strongly believe that water is a natural resource created by God and it does not belong to 
anyone. The statistically significant results imply that the variation in willingness to pay for 
water resources among farmers differ across irrigation schemes. For example, the strong 
willingness in NIS could be attributed to important recognition given to water as they farm for 
income generation. Moreover, they hope that paying will ensure reliable access to irrigation 
water supply.  Fanadzo & Ncube (2018) inferred that smallholder irrigators are only prepared 
to pay for water resources only if they are assured reliable access to water for irrigation and 
other productive uses.  
Table 2. Water authorization and training in the study irrigation schemes  
 
Water authorization 
 
Response 
Irrigation Scheme 
MRIS TFIS NIS 𝜒2 
Availability of water licence (%) Agree 34.2 34.2 11.8 *** 
Strongly Agree 5.0 0.0 5.9 
Availability of water rights (%) Yes 71.7 75.8 36.4 *** 
Willingness to pay for water 
resource (%) 
Yes 44.2 41.4 100.0 *** 
Note: *** = p<0.01; ** = p <0.05; * = p<0.10 and NS= not statistically significant 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
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3.3.2 Scheme management 
Following the irrigation management transfer, the government delegated all the irrigation 
management responsibilities to local management institutions, the WUAs. However, due to the 
nonexistence of WUAs in the study irrigation schemes, the scheme committee acts as water 
management organization and carry out all the management responsibilities. MRIS, TFIS and 
NIS are managed by the primary (Block level) and the secondary committee (scheme level), 
which performed the following responsibilities: 
• ensures equitable water distribution among all irrigators in the blocks;  
• enforcing rules and regulation of the scheme;  
• inspecting irrigation infrastructure condition; 
•  planning, organising and enforcing farmer participation in irrigation infrastructure 
maintenance; 
• organizing the canal cleaning and collecting funds for repairs; 
• resolving water disputes in the scheme; and 
• attending to complaints raised by irrigators. 
The primary committee is democratically elected by scheme members while the secondary 
committee comprises of the chairpersons from different Blocks. However, the secondary 
committee is not effective in MRIS and TFIS. Table 3 presents farmer perceptions of 
management effectiveness in the scheme. Across the study irrigation schemes, irrigators were 
satisfied with the primary committee and perceived the election process to be fair. The 
management system was functional, meetings were held monthly, and irrigators were involved 
in decision-making processes and in making rules on the scheme. This indicates transparency 
in the scheme. 
All the study irrigation schemes had constitution drafted by the scheme members with the 
assistance from extension officers and traditional authorities. The constitution stipulates the 
rules regarding land and water allocation, operation of the scheme, penalties for non-
compliance, norms for farmer participation and conflict resolution mechanism. During focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews, irrigators confirmed the existence of the 
constitution and perceived the constitution to be effective in the management of water 
resources. However, the survey results revealed the opposite in MRIS and TFIS.  
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Table 3. Farmer perceptions of management effectiveness  
 
Irrigation 
scheme 
SD D N A SA 𝜒2  
Satisfied with the current 
executive committee (%) 
 
MRIS 3.3 8.3 11.7 37.5 39.2 NS 
 TFIS 1.7 5.8 10.8 45.0 36.7 
NIS 5.9 2.9 2.9 55.9 32.4 
The election process of the 
executive committee is fair 
(%) 
 
MRIS 1.7 5.8 12.5 39.2 40.8 NS 
 TFIS 2.5 1.7 10.8 41.7 43.3 
NIS 0.0 0.0 2.9 52.9 44.1 
Satisfied with the 
involvement of farmers in 
making rules (%) 
 
MRIS 3.3 4.2 16.7 53.3 22.5 *** 
 TFIS 0.0 3.3 16.7 41.7 38.3 
NIS 0.0 0.0 11.8 82.4 5.9 
Existence of appropriate 
rules in irrigation water 
management (%) 
MRIS 1.7 2.5 28.3 56.7 10.8 ** 
TFIS 0.8 3.3 31.7 43.3 20.8 
NIS 0.0 3.0 3.0 66.7 27.3 
Existence of constitution to 
assist irrigation water 
management (%) 
MRIS 2.5 5.8 52.5 20.0 19.2 *** 
TFIS 0.0 13.3 52.5 14.2 20.0 
NIS 3.0 6.1 0.0 69.7 21.2 
The constitution is effective 
in management of water 
resources (%) 
MRIS 1.7 6.7 44.2 36.7 10.8 *** 
TFIS 0.0 15.0 32.5 36.7 15.8 
NIS 3.0 3.0 12.1 66.7 15.2 
Satisfied with the level of 
contribution of the traditional 
council in rule enforcement 
(%) 
MRIS 1.7 6.7 22.5 46.7 22.5 *** 
TFIS 5.0 9.2 41.7 29.2 15.0 
NIS 5.9 20.6 29.4 35.3 8.8 
Fairness in water allocation 
rules (%) 
MRIS 6.7 11.7 21.7 45.0 15.0 ** 
TFIS 2.5 1.7 10.0 60.8 25.0 
NIS 6.1 15.2 3.0 60.6 15.2 
Fairness of the scheme rules 
(%) 
MRIS 5.0 11.7 17.5 52.5 13.3 * 
TFIS 2.5 2.5 10.8 65.0 19.2 
NIS 0.0 12.1 12.1 60.6 15.2 
Compliance to the rules of 
the scheme (%) 
MRIS 0.8 0.0 10.8 31.7 56.7 NS 
TFIS 0.0 3.3 15.0 25.8 55.8 
NIS 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 63.6 
Note: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.10 and NS = not statistically significant 
SD= Strongly disagree; D= Disagree; N=Neutral; A= Agree and SA= Strongly agree 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
32 
 
A high percentage of irrigators (52.5%) from MRIS and TFIS neither affirmed nor denied, 
implying that the majority of irrigators had no knowledge about the scheme constitution and 
its importance. This could be attributed to ordinary scheme members not attending scheme 
meetings. Only the majority of irrigators from NIS who affirmed the existence of the 
constitution.  
The scheme rules including water allocation rules stipulated in the constitution were perceived 
as fair. Irrigators also showed satisfactory compliance with the scheme rules (more than 80% 
compliance), especially in NIS where everyone complied. 
However, there was no statistically significant difference in the variation in farmer perceptions 
of the election process, the effectiveness of the scheme committee and compliance of irrigators 
with the scheme rules across the study irrigation schemes, implying that election process was 
similar across. The statistically significant variation in the existence of scheme rules and 
constitution, their effectiveness and fairness imply scheme rules, water allocation differs across 
the schemes due to different irrigation technologies employed. 
Unfortunately, most irrigators were not willing to participate in the scheme committee. In the 
feedback workshops irrigators showed no interest for participating in scheme leadership for the 
following reasons: it is not easy to lead people since they have different personalities; being a 
member of the scheme committee is time-consuming and end up neglecting your crops, 
sometimes do not even get water on your irrigation day; self-doubt not educated and not used 
to meetings, and it is costly, you use your own money for transport and phone calls, and time 
away from plots. 
3.3.3 Land allocation 
The study irrigation schemes are in rural areas where the chief is the custodian of land and 
responsible for land allocation. Across the schemes, irrigators did not have title deeds, only 
Permission to Occupy (PTO). In NIS irrigators acquire land from Ingonyama Trust. In MRIS 
and TFIS irrigators were satisfied with land allocation and did not want the terms of land 
allocation to change, while irrigators in NIS revealed that they were not happy with terms of 
land allocation because customary laws might change in the future (Figure 2). Results indicated 
insignificant land rental across the schemes indicating non-existence of land market. 
Farmer satisfaction and the perceptions with land allocation showed statistically significant 
differences across the schemes. This implies that although all the study irrigation schemes are 
under tribal authorities, terms of land allocation differ across. For example, in MRIS, both men 
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and women can obtain land from the chief. While women in TFIS were discriminated as only 
men are given land by the chief. Women can only inherit land in the death of a husband and 
only sons can inherit land in the death of both parents.  
 
Figure 2. Farmer perception of land allocation 
Source: Survey data (2018)  
Land ownership and the way irrigable is acquired in this study is consistent with what has been 
reported in the literature. The majority of women acquired land through inheritance, traditional 
allocation and/ or given by relatives. However, most of the plots held were not in their names 
(Table 4).  
Table 4. Land ownership across gender in the scheme 
Land ownership           Gender  
𝜒2 Female Male 
Traditional allocation (%) 44.2 49.1  
 
* 
Rented (%) 0.9 5.5 
State supplied (%) 2.3 1.8 
Inherited (%) 32.3 29.1 
Owned (%) 5.1 9.1 
Given by relative (%) 15.2 5.5 
In your name (%) 45.6 74.1 *** 
Note: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05 and * = p<0.10  
Source: Survey data (2018) 
Likewise, young people acquired land through inheritance and did not have ownership of the 
plots they were cultivated as the plots were not registered in their names (Table 5). This also 
came up in the feedback workshop in TFIS where irrigators revealed that women were not 
allowed to acquire land on their own and daughters were not allowed to inherit land from their 
parents, only sons were allowed. The unequal treatment between men and women can be 
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attributed to customary laws and cultural norms since land is administered by traditional 
authorities.  
Table 5. Land ownership across age groups in the scheme  
 
Land ownership 
Age Group (Years)  
𝜒2 20-35 36-56 57-69 70-88 
Traditional allocation 25.8 37.4 58.2 50.0  
 
 
*** 
Rented 6.5 1.9 1.1 0.0 
State supplied 0.0 0.9 2.2 7.1 
Inherited 51.6 32.7 25.3 28.6 
Owned 0.0 9.3 2.2 9.5 
Given by relative 16.1 17.8 11.0 4.8 
In your name 20.7 24.3 74.7 90.2 *** 
Note: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05 and * = p<0.10  
Source: Survey data (2018) 
Land distribution across gender and age group had statistically significant variations across 
indicating that men and women are not equally treated and that the young and elderly do not 
have equal accessibility to land resources in rural areas.  
3.3.4 Water distribution and management 
The study irrigation schemes had different water distribution mechanisms, and this can be 
attributed to the irrigation techniques employed. NIS uses modern irrigation technology 
(sprinklers) which enables all irrigators to irrigate simultaneously. Hence, irrigation schedule 
was not used, and irrigators could irrigate daily. On the contrary, MRIS and TFIS had rotational 
irrigation schedule and irrigators were only supposed to access irrigation water once a week as 
per irrigation schedule. The stipulated irrigation roster in MRIS specified that Monday was for 
Blocks 1-4; Tuesday for 5-8, Wednesday for Blocks 9-13 while Thursday and Friday were for 
Blocks 14-15. No one was permitted to irrigate on Saturday due to traditional restrictions. 
Sunday as well was not assigned for irrigation. Across the schemes, irrigation water usage at 
plot level was not monitored, irrigators used water according to their own perceived needs.  
According to Annandale et al. (2011), irrigation scheduling plays a significant role in 
minimizing water wastage and stabilizing agricultural production during the periods of water 
stresses. Many SISs in developing countries such as Haiti, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, South Africa 
etc, use irrigation schedule for water distribution (Letsoalo & Van Averbeke, 2005; Boyer, 
2007; Deribe, 2008). Figure 3 shows that irrigators across the study irrigation schemes were 
satisfied with the irrigation schedule and perceive water distribution to be fair. However, there 
was an inherent water conflict that occurs between irrigators within and between blocks. 
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Among the study irrigation schemes, NIS irrigators were most satisfied with the irrigation 
schedule and perceived water distribution as fair. While MRIS had outstanding water conflicts 
with and between blocks. Downstream irrigators complained that those upstream obstruct the 
flow in canals to irrigate their own crops. A similar problem was experienced in other irrigation 
schemes in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, etc (Samakande et al., 2002; Letsoalo & Van 
Averbeke, 2005; Simitu & Odira, 2007). Irrigators revealed that before decentralization 
government hired water-bailiffs who assisted with the control of water withdrawals from the 
canal. MRIS irrigators still believe that hiring water-bailiffs could be a solution to the low water 
supply at the scheme tail-end.  
 
Figure 3. Water distribution system and conflicts across the study irrigation schemes 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
Irrigators across the schemes were not legally recognized as water users since they were not 
registered and did not have water permit nor water rights, hence they were not paying for water 
resources. NIS and TFIS irrigators were only paying for electricity and diesel consumed by the 
water pump, respectively. Most irrigators in MRIS and TFIS were not willing to pay for water 
because they regarded it as a natural resource rather than as an economic good.  
3.3.5 Enforcement of rules 
Across irrigation schemes, noncompliance and unlawful behaviour were reported to the scheme 
committee where they were punished accordingly, usually by imposing a monetary fine. 
Traditional authorities also played an important role in the disciplinary of irrigators and 
resolving water conflicts. Involvement of the Chief made the fine to be heavier than that 
imposed by the scheme committee. However, it is often difficult to impose penalties due to 
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humanity. For example, in TFIS, irrigators revealed that there were no penalties imposed for 
non-compliance. Irrigators in MRIS indicated that offenders were punished and there were 
some cases where noncompliance was reported to the Chief, and offenders had to pay a fine 
amounting to R300. Figure 4 showed that irrigators across the scheme believed that penalties 
impose for noncompliance were fair and the rules were not hard to enforce. This is also 
reflected by the high percentage of farmer perception on compliance with scheme rules (Table 
3). 
 
Figure 4. Rule enforcement and fairness of penalties 
Source: Survey Data (2018) 
Unlawful behaviour was often not reported in MRIS and TFIS. Farmers threaten each other 
with death which instilled fear among weak farmers. A similar situation was also reported by 
Samakande et al. (2002) where farmers threaten each other with witchcraft. MRIS and TFIS 
had the problem of unauthorized water withdrawals by community members for domestic 
purposes including laundry, brick making, livestock drinking, etc. which contributed to a 
decrease in water supply.  
3.3.6 Conflict resolution mechanism 
Water theft and non-compliance with irrigation schedules are often the main cause of conflicts. 
Table 3 shows that irrigators across the study irrigation schemes were satisfied with the conflict 
resolution mechanism. Conflicts were managed informally and out of court through the 
following mechanism: 
• One-to-one level: Irrigators involved in the dispute speak out and resolve the conflict  
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• Block level: In the failure of the one-on-one dispute resolution, the chairperson of the 
block gives both parties a chance to talk about the source of a dispute then give a more 
trusted judgement 
•  Scheme level: This is usually employed when the dispute is between blocks and if the 
above mechanisms fail. The scheme committee (secondary committee) is involved to 
give their best judgment to the cause of the dispute. 
• Traditional authorities and the community court: This is a more formal dispute 
resolution mechanism responsible for managing almost all types of disputes in the 
community. The Chief, Induna and the community gather to hear out the source of the 
conflict, only the chief gives out the final judgement and the fine if necessary. However, 
there are very rare scheme disputes that escalate to this point.  
Letsoalo & Van Averbeke (2005); Sokile et al. (2005) and Deribe (2008) in their studies also 
reported that conflicts were resolved informally, and irrigators preferred informal conflict 
resolution mechanisms and penalty enforcement over the formal mechanisms. 
3.3.7 Irrigation infrastructure maintenance 
The maintenance of irrigation infrastructure is crucial for the sustainability of an irrigation 
scheme and for improved agricultural output (Samakande et al., 2002). Following 
decentralization, irrigation infrastructure maintenance became the responsibility of irrigators. 
All irrigators participated either financially or physically in irrigation infrastructure 
maintenance. Since the irrigation infrastructure and irrigation technique used differ across 
irrigation schemes, farmer contribution in irrigation infrastructure maintenance also differ. 
MRIS used the canal and short furrow irrigation method, TFIS used both canal and water 
pumps, and a short furrow irrigation method, while NIS used water pump and sprinkler 
irrigation technique. Irrigation infrastructure maintenance in NIS is done by contractors, while 
irrigators contribute finances to pay them. While in MRIS and TFIS, irrigation infrastructure 
maintenance (canal cleaning) was physically done by irrigators, but the Department of Land 
Reform and Rural Development (DLRRD) rehabilitated the scheme. The farmers who 
absconded canal cleaning duties pay money or send someone to work on their behalf. During 
the survey, irrigators indicated high participation in irrigation maintenance especially in NIS 
(Figure 5), and the variation in farmer participation was statistically significant (p=0.0001) 
indicates the difference in irrigation infrastructure, the scale of production and understanding 
of IMT across the schemes. In NIS can only be maintained by hiring contractors while in the 
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other irrigation schemes irrigators can provide labour to fix the infrastructure themselves. 
Although irrigation management is now the responsibility of irrigators, they still plead for 
assistance with the maintenance of irrigation infrastructure as it expensive for them to maintain. 
 
Figure 5. The contribution of finances towards irrigation maintenance across irrigation schemes  
Source: Survey data (2018) 
 
3.3.8 External stakeholder participation  
Although irrigations schemes are now managed by water users, government and private sector 
still have a role to play to ensure the sustainability of SIS. Irrigators in the study irrigation 
schemes work together with different external stakeholders depending on which ones are 
available in the area. The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and 
LIMA provide extension services and production inputs (usually in the form of loan for LIMA) 
in MRIS and TFIS. DARD, LIMA, and TechnoServe provide various services to NIS irrigators. 
In MRIS and TFIS, extension officers are the only contact farmers have with the government 
department of agriculture.  
3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Studies that have been conducted in developing countries to assess the institutional 
arrangements on water management indicated that SISs largely use informal rules in managing 
the scheme, and water resources. In most irrigation schemes informal water institutions and 
farmer participation in irrigation management have shown positive results and have contributed 
to the sustainability of SISs, although the claims of unsatisfactory performance remain.  
The results obtained in this study indicated that MRIS, TFIS and NIS had functional institutions 
governing the use and management of water resources. The scheme committee facilitated the 
scheme management responsibilities such as water allocation, rule enforcement, conflict 
resolution, organising irrigation infrastructure maintenance. Traditional authorities also played 
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an important role in scheme, especially in conflict resolution. Irrigators participated in 
irrigation management and in decision-making processes in the scheme, which could have 
contributed to the sustainability of the study irrigation schemes.  
The prevailing institutional arrangements in the study irrigation schemes seemed to be effective 
as the schemes, particularly MRIS and TFIS have been operational for a long time. Although 
NIS is a newly established irrigation scheme with modern irrigation technology, institutional 
arrangements in the scheme work effectively to sustain the operation of the scheme. Irrigators 
do everything by themselves without government assistance. This indicates that irrigators 
understand that they are in the IMT era and this should be encouraged also in MRIS and TFIS. 
Irrigators should be encouraged to take all the scheme matters to their own hands.  
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter addressed the first objective of the study which was to describe institutional 
arrangements for water management in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation 
scheme using the descriptive statistical technique. It started off by generalizing on the 
institutional arrangements in SISs. Results revealed that all the study irrigation schemes had 
functional water institutions that were effective in irrigation and scheme management. The 
schemes had Block committees responsible for water allocation, formulating and enforcing 
scheme rules, resolving conflicts with an aid of traditional authorities, as well as to arrange 
irrigation infrastructure maintenance. Plots within the scheme were allocated by the chief. The 
next chapter will address the second objective of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DETERMINANTS OF FARMER AWARENESS OF WATER 
GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS ACROSS INTERGENERATIONAL AND GENDER 
DIMENSIONS IN SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN KWAZULU-
NATAL PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Abstract 
 
Water is a vital resource for irrigated agricultural production and its availability and 
accessibility is critical for alleviating poverty and achieving food security in rural households. 
However, the smallholder irrigated agriculture in South Africa faces limited water supply 
emanating from scheme governance problems, with weak institutional arrangements that fail 
to equitably and effectively govern water resources. Poor institutional arrangements of water 
use and management in smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa make most schemes 
dysfunctional. Although recognised globally as progressive water policy, the South African 
National Water Act of 1998 is unknown in SISs. This chapter argues that both formal and 
informal water institutions are essential for efficient and sustainable distribution and use of 
irrigation water among users.  
This study sought to assess farmer awareness of water governance across intergenerational and 
gender dimensions in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation schemes. The study 
employed Principal Component Analysis to generate water institution indices, that is, formal 
institution, the existence and effectiveness of scheme constitution, scheme committee and 
enforcement of informal rules in the scheme. The Ordinary Least Square regression technique 
was then used to identify factors determining farmer awareness of formal and informal water 
institutions in the three irrigation schemes. 
The findings suggest that formal water institutions are unknown and factors such as household 
characteristics, irrigation scheme, stakeholder participation and involvement in scheme 
decision-making processes significantly influence awareness of governance. Therefore, there 
is a need to raise farmer awareness of formal water institutions and to strengthen the informal 
institutions which are functional, recognised and in line with irrigation management transfer. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Water is a vital resource for irrigated agricultural production, its availability and accessibility 
are critical for alleviating poverty and achieving food security in rural households (Denby, 
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2013). However, the smallholder irrigated agriculture in South Africa faces limited water 
supply emanating from scheme governance problems, with weak institutional arrangements 
that fail to equitably and effectively govern water resources (Denby, 2013). In many African 
countries, water has been traditionally acquired from open water sources such as natural 
springs, hand dug wells or surface water, hence institutions regarding management were 
unknown (Schnegg & Bollig, 2016). This is because in the past water rights were not important 
and inferior to land rights. The rapidly growing water demand associated with water scarcity 
leads to the tragedy of the commons, whereby the resource deteriorates due to lack of control 
and incentives to protect it (Meinzen-Dick & Nkoya, 2005).  
According to Tshuma & Monde (2012) and Muchara (2014), poor institutional arrangements 
and management in SISs in South Africa make most of them dysfunctional. Therefore, water 
rights, water governance and institutional arrangements to control and regulate the use of water 
become extremely important. However, the nature of water and its properties in rural areas 
make the definition of water rights difficult and costly since water rights are inherently linked 
to land rights such that ownership of an irrigation plot automatically gives the right to irrigation 
water access. Meinzen-Dick & Nkoya (2005) argued that the effectiveness of water rights is 
conditional on the availability of strong institutional arrangements and sound governance.  
South Africa has transformed its water laws to address past racial imbalances in accessing 
water created by the apartheid government. In 1998, South Africa enacted the NWA with an 
intention to “decentralise and integrate water management, create new local and regional 
institutions with equal representation, register and licence water use and finally to facilitate the 
emergence of a water rights market” (Denby, 2013: 2). In 2006, the WAR policy was 
implemented to reallocate water from the advantaged to economically disadvantaged 
individuals. However, the implementation of NWA and WAR has been slow, and their 
expected outcomes have not been realised. For example, compulsory licensing which is one of 
the mechanisms of the WAR programme has not been widely implemented (DWA, 2013). 
Likewise, although the NWA is recognised globally as progressive water policy, it is unknown 
in SISs (Denby, 2013). Meinzen-Dick & Nkonya (2005) argued that if the range and 
complexity of institutions governing the use of water resources are not understood, any efforts 
to improve water allocations will be ineffective and not yield the desired outcomes. 
Irrigators in SISs define their own rules and regulations regarding water use. Consequently, 
customary laws tend to be strong and powerful than formal laws. Moreover, statutory laws are 
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unknown at scheme level due to insufficient communication between government and 
irrigators (Meinzen-Dick & Nkoya, 2005). Therefore, the study sought to identify the 
determinants of farmer awareness of water governance dimensions across intergenerational and 
gender dimensions in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation schemes, South Africa.  
4.2 Water Institutions for Irrigation Schemes in South Africa 
 
The theoretical framework for this study explains water governance structure in SISs, farmer 
awareness of water governance and farmer perceptions about the effectiveness of governance 
in irrigation water allocation and management. Figure 6 illustrates the framework of water 
governance structure in SISs. The study argues that both formal and informal water institutions 
are essential for efficient and sustainable distribution of irrigation water among users. 
According to Gallaher & Heikkila (2014), water governance is about collective decisions and 
choices relating to the use and management of water resources that emerges through 
institutions. It encompasses the mechanisms of setting rules and institutions with which water 
resources are managed. Moreover, water governance decides on who gets how much water, 
when and how (Hill, 2013). This framework uses water institutions to represent water 
governance. 
Water institutions consist of both formal and informal institutions shaping the actions of 
irrigators towards water resources and specifying the permissible and restricted behaviour 
(Gallaher & Heikkilla, 2014). According to Sokile et al. (2005: 1), formal institutions are “the 
written ordinances created by the legislative council before the independence and 
contemporary legislation in one hand”, while, informal water institutions are defined as “the 
set of local, community-based practices that are normally determined by local customs, 
traditions and culture of water use”. The key pillars of water institutions include water laws, 
water policies and water organizations (Boyer, 2007).  
Gallaher & Heikkilla (2014) argued that sustainable use and management of water resources 
can be achieved through institutions and organizations. Efficient and sustainable use of 
irrigation water and irrigation schemes is influenced by both formal and informal institutions 
and the participation of irrigation water users. According to Sokile et al. (2005) and Deribe 
(2008), formal and informal water institutions are interlinked, and their effectiveness depends 
on the constitutions, water management organizations at national, basin and scheme level as 
well as the customary behavioural changes of the society 
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Figure 6. The framework of water governance structure in smallholder irrigations schemes  
Source: Authors compilation (2018)  
 
4.2.1 Formal water institutions 
a) National level 
At the macro level, the government is the custodian of water resources and water management 
is solely guided by formal water institutions (water policies, water laws and water management 
organizations) (Sokile et al., 2015). The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) 
implemented the NWA to ensure that South Africa’s water resources were protected, used, 
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developed, conserved, managed and controlled (RSA, 1998). The Act proposes to redress past 
racial imbalances in water access by the apartheid government which gave privileges to the 
white minority and to ensure equitable access to water as well as to improve efficiency and 
sustainability in water use. To achieve its objectives, the Act established two water resource 
management organizations, the CMA and WUA, which allows water user participation in the 
decision-making process. Vermillion (1999) cited in Boyer (2007) argued that irrigation 
scheme will not achieve satisfactory performance levels without basic institutional reforms 
such as decentralization of irrigation management to irrigators and their organizations.  
b) Catchment level 
The CMAs are statutory bodies established to manage water resources at the catchment level. 
The key functions of the CMA included developing and implementing the catchment 
management agency strategy underpinning the principles of the NWA in a defined 
management area and promotes community participation in water resource management 
(Karodia & Weston, 2001). CMAs have a link with many other water management institutions 
such as WUAs, DWAF, etc.  WUAs assist in implementing the CMA strategy at a local level. 
The implementation of CMAs in South Africa has not been successful. Bourblanc & Blanchon 
(2014) reported that only two CMAs had been established. Poor administration, 
mismanagement, lack of training of newly appointed public servants and coordination 
problems are among the reasons contributing to the failure of CMAs (Bourblanc & Blanchon, 
2014). 
c) Local level 
Although the NWA permits the abstraction of water without licences or permits, irrigators were 
required to form WUAs, so they can apply for water license which will determine the amount 
of water each user is entitled to withdraw from normal situations as well as their collective 
rights to the water resource and their obligation (RSA, 1998; Perret, 2002). However, the 
adoption of WUAs in South Africa is very poor because its role has never been conceptualized 
nor fully defined to smallholder irrigators from the onset. Meinzen-Dick (1997) cited in 
Saruchera (2008) argued that the success of WUAs can only be realised if there are sound legal 
frameworks, incentives for irrigators to participate, sufficient knowledge about WUAs, 
significant understanding of water issues and effective communication skills. In other 
developing countries where WUAs have been established, smallholder farmers claim that 
WUAs do not provide the kind of benefits they are expecting such as lobbying government 
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support to practice meaningful agriculture and that WUAs are ineffective and not beneficial to 
the previously disadvantaged.   
4.2.2 Informal water institutions 
Although both formal and informal water institutions are equally important in water resource 
management, informal institutional arrangements tend to be more valuable, influential and 
powerful at scheme level due to low dissemination of the state laws. Moreover, irrigators have 
an incentive to follow and enforce rules they formulated themselves than those handed down 
from an outside authority (Tang & Ostrom 1993; Sokile et al., 2005; Deribe 2008). There are 
often contradictions between formal and informal water institutions, and most contradictions 
tend to appear from those formal institutions that encourage gender equity (Bandaragoda & 
Firdousi, 1992; Huggins, 2002). Meinzen-Dick & Nkoya (2005) argued that customary laws 
lack the equity principle which greatly affects the distribution of resources among users, 
leaving women and the poor vulnerable. While, state laws always seek to ensure equality in 
resource allocation, at least on paper. 
4.2.3 Farmer awareness and perceptions about water institutions 
With little evidence documented, smallholder irrigators seem to be unaware of formal water 
institutions. Mehta et al. (2014) found that smallholder farmers in the Inkomati catchment 
management area (South Africa) lack knowledge of the NWA, formal water policy and other 
formal channels for accessing water reflecting poor communication between national 
government, local government and water users at the farm level. In Haiti, irrigators perceived 
informal water institutions together with strong farmer participation more convenient and 
perform better in providing related services to farmers as compared to formal institutional 
settings. In addition, operational rules, rule enforcement, sharing responsibilities among 
members, matching cost-recovery to relevant provided services have been more efficient and 
effective in farmer-managed irrigation systems compared to agency-managed irrigation system 
(Boyer, 2007: 14). Likewise, in the studies by Sokile et al. (2005) and Deribe (2008) 
smallholder irrigators operated with informal institutions and preferred informal conflict 
resolution mechanisms and penalty enforcement over the formal mechanisms. The high 
preference for informal institution indicates that formal institutions are unknown or ineffective, 
or that informal water institutions are very effective in water and scheme management.  
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4.3 Methodology 
 
This section provides the research methods used in this study, briefly explaining the study area, 
sampling and data collection techniques, data analysis method used as well as describing the 
independent and dependent variables used in the analysis. 
4.3.1 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework for this study has been discussed in detail in chapter 3, section 3.2.1. 
4.3.2 Study area 
The survey was undertaken in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry Irrigation Schemes located in Msinga 
Local Municipality in Umzinyathi District and Ndumo Irrigation Scheme located in Jozini 
Local Municipality in Umkhanyakude District. Irrigation schemes from different districts were 
included to capture the variation in farmer awareness of water governance since both formal 
and informal water institutions influence water-use efficiency and sustainability of the 
irrigation scheme. Table 6 summarises the characteristics of the study irrigation schemes.  
Table 6. Characteristics of the study irrigation schemes 
 
Description  
Irrigation scheme 
MRIS TFIS NIS 
District  uMzinyathi  uMzinyathi  uMkhanyakude 
Local Municipality Msinga Msinga Jozini 
Average annual 
rainfall 
600-700 mm per 
annum 
600-700 mm per 
annum 
600-800 mm per 
annum 
Total irrigated land ~600ha ~800ha  ~1500ha 
The composition of 
the scheme 
15 blocks, all 
functional  
7 blocks, one block 
(6) not irrigated 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Water source and 
diversion method 
Mooi River; canal Tugela River, Canal, 
diesel and electric 
water pump  
Pongola River, 
electric water pump 
Irrigation method Canal – furrow 
irrigation 
Canal and piped-
furrow irrigation 
Sprinkler 
Management type Farmer-managed Farmer-managed Farmer-managed 
Water distribution 
method 
Irrigation schedule Irrigation schedule in 
block 4  
None 
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Source: Msinga Municipality (2011); Muchara et al. (2014); Jozini Municipality (2017) 
 
4.3.3 Data collection methods and sampling techniques 
Data collection methods and sampling techniques used in the study were discussed in chapter 
3, section 3.2.2. 
4.3.4 Empirical model 
The study employed the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) techniques. PCA was used to generate indices indicating formal and informal water 
institutions in SISs. OLS regression technique was applied to identify factors influencing 
farmer awareness of formal and informal water institutions. Several researchers including 
Muchara (2014); Wuttichaikitcharoen & Babel (2014) used this approach. 
4.3.4.1 Principal Component Analysis 
According to Everitt & Hothorn (2011: 61), PCA is a “multivariate technique with the central 
aim of reducing the dimensionality of a multivariate data set while accounting for as much of 
the original variation as possible”. It transforms original variables to a new set of variables, the 
principal components (PCs), that are a linear combination of the original variables, which are 
ordered so that the first few PCs retain most of the variation present in all original variables 
(Jolliffe, 1986; Everitt & Hothorn, 2011). Moreover, PCA eliminates the possibility of 
multicollinearity by replacing the highly correlated variable with few uncorrelated PCs 
(Jolliffe, 1986). The major indicators on formal and informal water institutions were asked in 
a Likert scale type questions, with farmers indicating whether they strongly disagreed, 
disagreed, were neutral, agreed or strongly disagreed. Index values increase from 1 to 5 if the 
respondent strongly agrees and decreases from 5 to 1 if the respondent strongly disagrees.  
4.3.4.2 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model 
The generated indices from the PCA were regressed against explanatory variables known to 
influence farmer awareness using the OLS technique. The number of regression models to be 
estimated equals the number of the retained PCs.  According to Gujarati & Porter (2009), the 
OLS regression model can be specified as 
 𝑌𝑖  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖  + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                             
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the water institution index for the ith irrigator; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory 
variables; 𝛽0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑖 are the vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝜇𝑖 is the error term.   
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4.3.5 Description of dependent and explanatory variables 
Dependent Variables 
The suitability of data set to be used in PCA was examined using Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
which checks if the observed correlation matrix diverges significantly from the identity matrix 
(H0: the variables are orthogonal) and the Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) which is a measure 
of sampling adequacy. The Bartlett’s tests for formal and informal water institutions were 
statistically significant (p=0.0001) implying that the variables were not inter-correlated 
suggesting that the PCA can be performed efficiently on the data set. The KMO for formal and 
informal institutions were 0.603 and 0.631, respectively. Both these values were at least 0.5 
implying that the PCA can precisely be applied to the data set (Kaiser & Rice, 1974). 
The PCs were generated using a covariance matrix since the variables included had similar 
scale measurement, Likert scale (Everitt & Hothorn, 2011). The decision on the number of PCs 
to retain was based on the Kaiser criterion which suggests that PCs with eigenvalues above one 
can be retained was applied (Ibid.). Hence, three PCs representing informal and another three 
PCs representing formal water institutions were retained. Table 7 and 8 present the generated 
PCs as indicators formal and informal water institutions, respectively.  
With reference to Table 7, the first three PCs retained explained for 72.13% of the total 
variation in the data, cumulatively. The first PC had a higher explanatory power, explaining 
about 36.35% variation in farmer awareness of formal water institutions. The second and third 
PC accounted for 18.72% and 17.07%, respectively. The PC vector of PC1 is economically 
meaningful, as all its coefficients are positive and have larger component loadings. Each 
variable represents formal institutions governing water in irrigation schemes. Therefore, the 
positive component loadings indicate that PC1 represents farmer awareness of formal water 
institutions (FORMAL_INSTI). 
The first retained PC in Table 8 explained 29.53% of the total variation in the major indicators 
of formal water institutions and had similar signs of the estimated component loadings. PC1 
was found to be closely related to farmer perceptions of the effectiveness of the scheme 
committee in water resource management and conflict management in the scheme. Hence, it 
was named the availability of the scheme committee (SCHEME_COM). 
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Table 7. Principal component analysis of the major indicators of formal water institutions at 
scheme level 
 
Description of variables 
Principal Component 
𝑃𝐶1 𝑃𝐶1 𝑃𝐶1 
 
Awareness of NWA  0.902 -0.169 -0.095 
Awareness of NWRS 0.890 -0.163 -0.101 
Knowledge of government aims 0.596 -0.057 0.484 
Availability of water licences 0.118 0.758 -0.370 
Availability of water rights 0.156 0.610 0.682 
Knowledge of any WUA 0.427 0.343 -0.411 
Eigenvalue 2.181 1.123 1.024 
% of variance explained 36.34% 18.72% 17.07% 
Cumulative % variance explained 36.34% 55.06% 72.13% 
KMO 0.603 
Bartlett test of sphericity  ~𝜒2  = 372.542 (p < 0.001) 
Note: Component loadings greater than |0.40|are highlighted in bold print 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
The second retained PC accounted for 20.78% of the total variation in the major indicators of 
informal water institutions. This PC was found to be closely related to farmer perceptions of 
the effectiveness of the scheme constitution in water resource management in the scheme when 
scheme rules are hard to enforce. The scheme constitution stipulates the rules regarding land 
and water allocation, operation of the scheme, penalties for non-compliance, norms for farmer 
participation and conflict resolution mechanism. PC2 was therefore named farmer awareness 
of the existence of the scheme constitution (SCHEME_CONST), the role played by the scheme 
committee in enforcement rules stipulated in the scheme’s constitution. 
Irrigation schemes have rules developed for managing water resources, and those rules are 
stipulated in the constitution. For these rules to work effectively they need to be enforced. The 
third retained PC explained 18.42% of the total variation in the major indicators of informal 
water institutions. This PC was found to be closely related to farmer perceptions of difficulties 
in the enforcement of rules in the scheme. Hence, the PC was named rule enforcement 
(RULE_ENF). 
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Table 8. Principal component analysis of the major indicators of informal water institutions at 
scheme level 
 
Description of variables 
                         Principal Components 
𝑃𝐶1 
SCHEME_COM 
𝑃𝐶2 
SCHEME_CONST 
𝑃𝐶3 
RULE_ENF 
Presence of appropriate rules in 
irrigation water management  
 
0.2235 0.1548 -0.3591 
The existence of a constitution to assist 
in water management in the scheme  
 
0.3523 0.4359 -0.4068 
Difficulties in rule enforcement  
 
0.2495 0.5335 0.7629 
The effectiveness of constitution in 
water management  
 
0.3367 0.3192 -0.3013 
Fair penalties to non-compliance  
 
0.3463 0.0266 0.1057 
Satisfaction with conflict management 
in the scheme  
 
0.4265 -0.1985 0.0889 
Satisfaction with the scheme 
committee  
 
0.4468 -0.4761 0.1149 
Fairness in the election process of the 
scheme committee 
 
0.3858 -0.3644 0.0228 
Eigenvalue 2.173 1.529 1.355 
Variance explained 29.53% 20.78% 18.42% 
Cumulative % of variance explained 29.53% 50.31% 68.78% 
KMO 0.631 
Bartlett test of sphericity  ~𝜒2 = 690.388    p < 0.001 
Note: Component loadings greater than |0.40|are highlighted in bold print 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
 
Explanatory variables 
Studies that have been done on farmer awareness indicated that household characteristics, 
membership in farmer organisations, source of information, access to extension services and 
stakeholder participation are some of the influential factors to farmer awareness to national 
policies (Muatha, 2014; Okpeke et al., 2015; Duhan & Singh, 2017; Duhan & Dhingra, 2018). 
Therefore, this study predicted that farmer awareness of water institutions is influenced by 
household demographics, scheme location, stakeholder involvement in the scheme, 
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participation in scheme leadership and in decision-making processes, membership in farmer 
organizations and accessible sources of information. However, the effects of factors 
influencing farmers awareness of water institutions vary across formal and informal water 
institutions. Due to the scantiness of existing literature on factors influencing farmers 
awareness of water institutions at scheme level, the relationships between institutional 
variables and the explanatory variables cannot clearly be depicted. Table 9 provides a 
description of the variables included in the analysis.  
Table 9. The description of variables included in the analysis and their anticipated effects 
Variable  Description Anticipated 
effect 
Explanatory Variables 
AGE The age of an irrigator (years) -/+ 
GENDER The gender of an irrigator (1 if male; 0 if otherwise) + 
EDUC_LEVEL The level of education an irrigator has received formal 
education (1= no formal; 2= primary; 3= secondary; 4= 
tertiary) 
+ 
SCHEME_LOC Scheme location (1=Msinga; 0=Jozini) +/- 
ROLE_SCHMLED The role played in scheme leadership (1=ordinary member; 
2= block committee; 3=secondary committee) 
+ 
WATM_TRAIN Whether an irrigator have received formal water management 
training (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 
+/- 
WUA_MEMB Whether an irrigator is a member of WUA (1 = yes; 0 
otherwise) 
+ 
GOVT_INV Involvement of government departments in the scheme 
management (index) 
+/- 
TRIBAUTH_INV Involvement of traditional authorities in the scheme 
management (index) 
-/+ 
INV_SCHMDEC Irrigator participation in decision-making processes in the 
scheme (index) 
+ 
INFO_SOURCE Source of information (index) + 
Dependent Variable 
FORMAL_INST Farmer awareness of formal water institutions (index) 
SCHEME_CONST Farmer awareness of the scheme constitution (index) 
SCHEME_COM Farmer perception about the effectiveness of the scheme committee (index) 
RULE_ENF Farmer perception about rule enforcement in the scheme (index) 
Source: Author’s compilation (2018) 
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Age: In general, age is one of the factors influencing the level of awareness. According to 
Duhan & Singh (2017), younger farmers read more from different information sources and are 
not as reluctant as elder farmers to changes in agricultural/ water policies, hence are more aware 
compared to elder farmers. They attributed this discrepancy to a different level of education 
obtained by the two groups. Therefore, in this study, elder irrigators are anticipated to be least 
aware of formal water institutions and more likely to be aware of informal water institutions.  
Gender: In SISs and the African culture women tend to be treated inferior although they make 
the largest proportion of smallholder farmers. Women are usually denied access to attend 
meetings, workshop or training (Mudege et al., 2017). Sometimes they are held by household 
activities they perform. According to Muatha (2014), male irrigators have a higher likelihood 
to be exposed to the water institutions. Therefore, holding other factors constant, male irrigators 
are anticipated to be more aware of water institutions than female irrigators. 
Level of education: According to Duhan & Dhingra (2018), literacy level and educational 
qualification influence the level of understanding and awareness. Less educated are assumed 
to be less aware of water institutions. However, this not always the case. SISs are dominated 
by elder farmers with no formal education but tend to be more aware of the scheme governance. 
A positive association between education and farmer awareness of formal institutions is 
expected, ceteris paribus.  
Scheme location: The location of an irrigation scheme (municipality) can influence farmer 
awareness of water institutions through the extent of external stakeholder involvement in water 
resource management. Since the study irrigation schemes are in different local municipalities 
held under the authorities, either a positive or negative influence on farmer awareness of water 
institutions can be expected.  
The role played in scheme leadership: Irrigators who participate in scheme decision-making 
processes are more likely to be informed about formal institutions and community affairs. 
According to Mowo et al. (2013), local leaders are relatively better educated and are the ones 
who draw local institutions in their leadership roles. This is because block committee and 
secondary committee members are scheme leaders, everything that has to do with farmers in 
SISs goes through the scheme committee, and if there are training or workshops to be provided 
to farmers, scheme committee members are always expected to attend.   
Training: Water management training is critical for improving water-use efficiency and 
sustainable use of irrigation water in SISs (Namara et al., 2010). Irrigators who have received 
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water management training are more likely to be aware of formal water institutions, ceteris 
paribus. Water management training provided by the irrigation committee is likely to 
disseminate information on the intentions of informal water institutions. Therefore, water 
management training (WATM_TRAIN) is anticipated to be positively related to farmer 
awareness of formal and negatively related to informal water institutions, ceteris paribus. 
Farmer organizations: Farmer organizations serve as a convenient platform for farmers to 
disseminate agriculture- and water-related information. WUA is a formal farmer organization 
established as a strategy for bringing governance in the scheme and for disseminating 
information about formal water institutions (Manzungu, 2000; Sokile et al., 2005). It is 
therefore anticipated that membership in WUA (WUA_MEMB) is expected to positively 
increase farmer awareness of both formal and informal water institution, ceteris paribus.  
Stakeholder participation: Water resource management in SA is through water legislation 
(NWA) focusing on ensuring equitable and sustainable allocation of water resources through 
authorization (licensing and registration) to avoid and control the risks of unsustainable water 
management (Namara et al., 2010). The involvement of government departments 
(GOVT_INV) in irrigation schemes will inform irrigators about the formal NWA, its aims and 
strategies. While the involvement of tribal authorities (TRIBAUTH_INV) is anticipated to 
increase farmer awareness of informal water institutions as they also play an important role in 
rule enforcement. Traditional authorities, particularly chiefs, have the power to influence rural 
farmers (Sokile et al., 2005; Deribe, 2008).  Farmer involvement in decision-making processes 
in the scheme (INV_SCHMDEC) relating water management activities is anticipated to 
enhance farmer awareness of water institutions, ceteris paribus. In addition, Muatha (2014) 
asserted that farmer engagement in scheme decision-making processes also plays an important 
role in maintaining harmony among irrigators. 
Source of information: Access to information plays a significant role in agricultural 
development (Mudege et al., 2017). The most important and easily accessible information 
sources in the study irrigation schemes include extension officers, media, irrigation committee 
and fellow farmers. Among these information sources, extension officers and the media play 
an important role in providing information on national policies (Muatha, 2014). Holding other 
factors constant, the source of information (INFO_SOURCE) is expected to positively increase 
farmer awareness of both formal and informal water institutions.  
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
This section presents the results obtained from the survey. It starts off by providing a brief 
description of household characteristics of the study, institutional arrangements in the scheme, 
sources of information and information distributing networks as well as an overview of 
econometric results obtained. 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
a) Household characteristics 
The results obtained from the household survey conducted from the study irrigation schemes 
indicated that MRIS and TFIS are dominated by women, elderly farmers with an average age 
of 57 and 55 years, respectively who had not acquired formal education (Table 10).  
Table 10. Household characteristics across the study irrigation schemes 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
Irrigation scheme  
𝜒2 MRIS TFIS NIS 
 
Age group (%)  
20 – 35 years 10.1 7.5 32.4 *** 
36 – 56 years 37.0 42.5 38.2 
57 – 69 years 34.5 35.0 23.5 
70 – 88 years 18.5 15.0 5.9 
 
Gender (%) 
Male 15.8 12.5 67.6 *** 
Female  84.2 87.5 32.4 
 
 
Level of Education (%)  
No formal 64.7 59.2 23.5  
*** Primary  19.3 28.3 23.5 
Secondary  13.4 11.7 32.4 
Tertiary  2.5 0.8 20.6 
Note: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.10; NS= not statistically significant 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
The dominance of women in MRIS and TFIS can be attributed the fact that irrigated farming 
is regarded as a female activity in Msinga, while male concentrated on cattle rearing and non-
farm activities (Muchara, 2014; Sinyolo et al., 2014). On the contrary, Ndumo irrigation 
scheme is dominated by young irrigators with an average age of 46 years and who are better 
educated with a considerable proportion of irrigators who have reached high school and tertiary 
level of education (Table 10). Unlike in other SISs, Ndumo irrigators are predominantly male. 
b) Farmer awareness of water institutions across irrigation schemes 
The results presented in Table 11 indicate that most irrigators were not aware of formal water 
institutions (WUAs, NWA and NWRS). Hence, the WUAs were non-existent. On average, 
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very few irrigators indicated to have received water management training in these schemes. 
NIS irrigators are most aware and have received more water management training than the 
other two irrigation schemes. 
Table 11. Farmer awareness of water institutions across irrigation schemes 
Water institution Awareness Irrigation scheme  
𝜒2 MRIS TFIS NIS 
Awareness of NWA (%) Agree 14.2 1.7 29.4  
 
*** Strongly Agree 2.5 0.0 17.6 
Awareness of NWRS (%) Agree 10.0 0.8 14.7  
 
*** 
Strongly Agree 1.7 0.0 14.7 
Knowledge of WUAs (%) Yes 6.7 0.8 6.7 * 
Member of WUA (%) Yes 0.0 0.0 3.1 ** 
Water management training (%) Yes 29.2 18.3 44.1 *** 
Note: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.10 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
The statistically significant differences in farmer awareness of formal water institutions across 
irrigation schemes could be attributed to the variation in the accessibility of relevant 
information. Among the available information sources, extension officers, media, fellow 
farmers, community meetings, irrigation committee, traditional leaders and cooperatives 
readily served as information sources for irrigators. 
4.4.2 Econometric results for factors influencing farmer awareness of water institutions 
With reference to Table 12 and 13, all the regression models estimated for farmers awareness 
of formal and informal water institutions were all statistically significant (p= 0.0001) implying 
that all the explanatory variables included in the models jointly had a meaningful influence on 
farmer awareness of formal and informal water institutions in MRIS, TFIS and NIS. The 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) estimated to test for multicollinearity among variables were 
all less than 10, indicating that multicollinearity was not a serious problem in the data set 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Moreover, heteroscedasticity was accounted for by using robust 
standard errors in the OLS regression.  
4.4.2.1 Factors influencing farmer awareness of formal water institutions in smallholder 
irrigations schemes 
The regression model had an R-squared equal to 0.2489 implying that 24.89% of the variation 
in farmer awareness of formal water institutions is explained by the explanatory variables 
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included in the model. The regression results indicated that among the explanatory variables 
included in the model, gender, level of education acquired, water management training, scheme 
location and farmer engagement in scheme decision making processes had positive and 
significantly influence farmer awareness of formal water institutions, except scheme location 
which had a negative association with farmer awareness of formal water institutions.  
The estimated coefficient of gender was found to be positive and statistically significant 
(p=0.05) as anticipated. This suggests that male irrigators were more aware of formal water 
institutions than female irrigators by 0.464, ceteris paribus. Cheteni (2016) found a positive 
association between gender and farmer awareness of biofuel crops. He argued that male 
farmers have a higher propensity of obtaining information faster than female farmers, and thus 
tend to have a higher level of awareness on agricultural activities or innovations.  
Table 12. Factors influencing farmer awareness of formal water institutions in Mooi River, 
Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation schemes, 2018  
FORMAL_INSTI Coefficient Robust Std. Error VIF 
AGE 0.001 NS 0.004  1.43 
GENDER 0.464 *** 0.184 1.35 
EDUC_LEVEL 0.276*** 0.084 1.56 
SCHEME_LOC -0.481*** 0.294 1.36 
WATM_TRAN 0.392*** 0.142 1.09 
ROLE_SCHMLED 0.057 NS 0.171    1.14 
GOVT_INV -0.012 NS 0.030 1.13 
TRIBAUTH_INV 0.043NS 0.035 1.06 
INV_SCHMDEC 0.106** 0.042 1.19 
INFO_SOURCE -0.048 NS 0.055 1.19 
_cons -0.436 NS 0.608  
Model Summary F-stat = 8.48;    p = 0.001       𝑅2 = 0.2489 
n= 274  
Mean VIF = 1.25 
Note: *** = p <0.01; ** =p < 0.05; * = p <0.10 and NS= not statistically significant  
Source: Survey data (2018) 
 
A statistically significant (p=0.01) and a positive association between the level of education 
and farmer awareness of formal water institutions was found as anticipated. Irrigators with a 
higher level of education were more aware of formal water institutions by 0.276 than those 
with no formal education, ceteris paribus. According to Duhan & Singh (2017), the level of 
education directly influences the level of awareness and the correlation between education and 
awareness level is high. They found a positive relationship between the level of education and 
farmer awareness of crop insurance. 
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The estimated coefficient of scheme location was found to have a negative and statistically 
significant (p=0.10) relationship with farmer awareness of formal water institutions. Irrigators 
in Msinga Local Municipality are less aware of formal water institutions than irrigators in 
Jozini Local Municipality by 0.481, ceteris paribus. This significant discrepancy between 
farmers awareness across these locations could be associated with differences in the 
accessibility of information and different sources of information. 
A statistically significant (p=0.001) and positive relation was found between farmer awareness 
of formal water institutions and water management training. Irrigators who have received water 
management training were more aware of formal water institutions by 0.392 compared to those 
who have not received the training.  
The estimated coefficient of farmer involvement in scheme decision making processes was 
found positive and statistically significant (p= 0.05) as anticipated prior. An increase in farmer 
involvement in the scheme decision-making processes increases farmer awareness of formal 
water institutions by 0.106 ceteris paribus. Participation in decision-making processes in the 
scheme makes irrigators to be aware and updated about new water laws implemented at the 
central level, given that the scheme committee is also aware of formal water institutions. 
4.4.2.2 Factors influencing farmer awareness of informal water institutions in smallholder 
irrigations schemes 
The regression results presented in Table 13 shows that the availability and the effectiveness 
of the scheme committee in water management was significantly influenced by scheme 
location (SCHEME_LOC), membership in WUA (WUA_MEMB), government involvement 
in SISs (GOVT_INV), tribal authority involvement in SISs (TRIBAUTH_INV) and farmer 
involvement in scheme decision making processes (INV_SCHMDEC). The 𝑅2 for the first 
regression model is 0.3042 implying that 30.42% of the variation in the availability and 
effectiveness of the scheme committee in water management is explained by the explanatory 
variables included in the model. 
Farmer awareness of the existence and effectiveness of the scheme constitution in water 
management as an indicator of informal water institutions was statistically influenced by the 
gender of an irrigator (GENDER), water management training received (WATM_TRAIN), 
membership in WUA (WUA_MEMB), farmer involvement in scheme decision making 
processes (INV_SCHMDEC) and the source of information (INFO_SOURCE). The 𝑅2 for the 
regression model is 0.1590 implying that 15.90% of the variation in the existence and 
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effectiveness of the constitution in irrigation water management is explained by the explanatory 
variables included in the model. 
Scheme location (SCHEME_LOC), membership in WUA (WUA_MEMB), farmer 
involvement in the scheme decision-making processes (INV_SCHMDEC) and the source of 
information (INFO_SOURCE) had statistically significant influence in rule enforcement in the 
scheme. The 𝑅2 for the model is 0.1745 implying that 17.45% of the variation in rule 
enforcement in the scheme is explained by the explanatory variables included in the model. 
Table 13. Factors influencing farmer awareness of informal water institutions 
(SCHEME_COM, SCHEME_CONST and RULE_ENF) in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and 
Ndumo irrigation schemes, 2018 
 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
SCHEME_COM SCHEME_CONST RULE_ENF  
VIF Coeff. Rob. 
Std 
Err. 
Coeff. Rob. Std 
Err. 
Coeff. Rob. 
Std 
Err. 
AGE 0.000NS 0.007 0.000NS 0.006 0.004NS 0.006 1.45 
GENDER -0.005NS 0.215 0.615** 0.250 -0.130NS 0.181 1.38 
EDUC_LEVEL -0.127NS 0.106 0.132NS 0.112 0.119NS 0.098 1.60 
SCHEME_LOC -0.478* 0.294 0.139NS 0.322 0.458** 0.221 1.45 
WATM_TRAN 0.051 NS 0.168 -0.291* 0.156 0.126NS 0.147 1.11 
ROLE_SCHMLED -0.291 NS 0.161 0.281NS 0.221 0.097NS 0.161 1.14 
WUA_MEMB -
1.174*** 
1.441 0.944** 0.419 -0.733* 0.375 1.12 
GOVT_INV 0.242*** 0.041 -0.021NS 0.040 0.018NS 0.038 1.13 
TRIBAUTH_INV 0.238*** 0.051 0.008NS 0.056 -0.027NS 0.048 1.07 
INV_SCHMDEC 0.449*** 0.072 -0.154** 0.067 0.181*** 0.059 1.19 
INFO_SOURCE -0.053NS 0.076 -
0.266*** 
0.069 -
0.393*** 
0.064 1.19 
_cons 7.807*** 0.989 1.953* 1.055 -0.003NS 0.861  
Model Summary F-stat = 10.17;   
p = 0.001 
𝑅2= 0.3042 
n= 274 
F-stat = 4.40;  
p = 0.001 
𝑅2= 0.1590  
n= 274 
F-stat = 4.92;   
p = 0.001 
𝑅2= 0.1745   
n= 274 
Mean 
VIF= 
1.26 
Note: *** = p <0.01; ** =p < 0.05; * = p <0.10 and NS= not statistically significant  
Source: Survey data (2018) 
 
a)The availability of the scheme committee  
The positive and statistically significant (p= 0.001) association between government 
involvement in SISs, tribal authority involvement in SISs, farmer involvement in scheme 
decision making processes and farmer awareness of the availability and effectiveness of the 
scheme committee in water management is consistent with the study expectations. The 
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government through extension officers, the traditional leaders, irrigators and the scheme 
committee often work together to overcome water-related issues and to develop effective water 
management strategies. Therefore, the involvement of government involvement and tribal 
authority in SISs and the involvement of farmer in scheme decision-making processes 
improves the effectiveness of the scheme committee in water management. Hence, traditional 
leaders, scheme irrigators and government department are more aware of informal water 
institutions.  
The statistically significant (p= 0.10) negative association relationship found between scheme 
location and farmer awareness of the availability of the scheme committee could be attributed 
to the severity of water supply challenges and irrigator’s lack of respect of the scheme rules 
regarding the accessing of irrigation water in Msinga. This makes it difficult for the scheme 
committee to its functions successfully. A statistically significant (p= 0.001) and negative 
relationship found between membership in WUA and farmer awareness of the availability and 
effectiveness of the scheme committee in water management can be because WUAs did not 
exist in the study irrigation schemes. 
b) The existence of the scheme constitution  
Male irrigators understand the constitution of the scheme better than female irrigators and 
perceived the operational rules stipulated on it to be effective in water resource and scheme 
management. This is because in rural areas leadership is considered as men’s task (Akroush & 
Telleria, 2013). Moreover, men cultivate bigger plots as they regard farming as a business, 
hence are more likely to hands-on in scheme and thus, more aware of the informal water 
institutions as anticipated. Although irrigators in the study irrigation schemes were not WUA 
members, the statistically significant association between membership in WUAs implies that 
membership in WUAs improves farmer awareness of the scheme constitution since the WUAs 
are established on the same setup as traditional irrigation schemes. 
An association between water management training, farmer involvement in the scheme 
decision-making processes, the source of information and farmer awareness of the scheme 
constitution and its effectiveness in water management contradicts the study expectations. The 
descriptive statistics indicated that most irrigators participated in the scheme decision-making 
processes. Likewise, water management training received by the scheme irrigators was 
informal and provided by the scheme committee and fellow farmers. In this way, irrigators 
could be informed with water management strategies documented in the constitution. The 
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negative relationship could mean that irrigators were not informed about the scheme 
constitution during the training. Among the information sources of the scheme irrigators, the 
irrigation committee and fellow farmers could disseminate information about the scheme 
committee. However, during the survey irrigators were only asked about their sources of 
agriculture-related information which could be the reason for the negative association between 
information source and the awareness of the scheme constitution.    
c) Enforcement of rules in the scheme 
A positive association was found between the location of an irrigation scheme, farmer 
involvement in the scheme decision making processes and farmer awareness of rule 
enforcement in the scheme. Irrigators in irrigation schemes in Msinga and farmers who 
participate in scheme decision-making processes are more likely to be aware of the rule 
enforcement in the scheme. This is because there are high incidents of unlawful behaviour and 
water conflicts in Msinga irrigation schemes compared to Jozini irrigation schemes. It is often 
difficult to report unlawful behaviour and impose penalties on irrigators due to fear of being 
killed, however, there are some case where irrigators are disciplined, and matters taken to 
traditional leaders. In this way, irrigators become aware that rules are enforced in the scheme. 
During the decision-making process issues of noncompliance are often discussed, the possible 
punishments to be imposed and the effective ways of enforcing rules in the scheme.  
The source of information does not inform irrigators about rule enforcement in the scheme, 
likewise, since WUAs is non-existence in the study irrigation schemes membership in WUA 
does not rise farmer awareness about rule enforcement in the scheme. 
4.5 Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
The study concludes that formal water institutions are unknown at the farm level, reflecting 
insufficient communication between government and irrigators. Instead, irrigators in SISs rely 
on informal institutional arrangements for water management, and these informal institutions 
work effectively. Formal water management institutions such as WUAs are unknown and non-
existent. Results revealed that male irrigators were more aware of both formal and informal 
institutions than their female counterparts. This could be attributed to customary laws and 
social norms which promote patriarchal power and limits women from participating in public 
organizations, local water governance and decision-making processes as traditionally, they are 
expected to do homestead activities. Age of irrigator did not influence farmer awareness of 
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both formal and informal water institutions in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation 
scheme. 
The study recommends that informal water institutions should be given recognition as they 
have proven to be effective in water resource management in SISs and to be more relevant to 
the local needs than Statutory water laws. In addition, customary laws must be incorporated 
when formulating national laws since irrigators tend to comply with rules locally set by 
traditional leaders. For the NWA to achieve its goals, the study suggests more efforts should 
be on raising farmer awareness to formal water institutions, what they entail and their aims. 
4.6 Summary 
 
The water policy for irrigation in South Africa has transformed over the years and smallholder 
irrigators might not be aware of them. This chapter assessed and identified factors influencing 
farmer awareness of water governance dimensions across intergenerational and gender 
dimensions in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry, and Ndumo irrigation schemes. Water governance 
dimensions were broken down into formal and informal water institution indices generated by 
PCA. Findings indicated that formal water institutions were unknown, hence, there was a high 
reliance on informal institutions. Factors influencing farmer awareness of water governance 
dimensions included gender, level of education, scheme location, membership in WUAs, 
stakeholder participation and farmer’s involvement in scheme decision-making processes. Age 
did not influence farmer awareness of water governance dimensions. The subsequent chapter 
focus on the third objective of the study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE ON CROP ALLOCATION IN 
SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES: A CASE OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Abstract 
Land and water resources are fundamental inputs for agricultural production and their 
management partly determines farm profitability. They are key for poverty alleviation and 
improved rural livelihood among smallholder irrigators. However, both resources have been 
falling, thus increasing the need for farmers to intensify farming and to make informed choices 
about the allocation of land to various crops. Irrigation is often constrained by the physical 
water supply or institutions, which may force irrigators to reduce the amount of irrigated land. 
It is therefore critically important to understand institutional settings that determine land and 
water availability and their influence on farmer decisions. 
This study investigates the effects of governance and other factors on crop choice and land 
allocation decisions across in smallholder irrigation schemes in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 
i.e., Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation schemes. The study applied the Fractional 
Logit Generalised Linear Model, and results indicated that age of an irrigator, size of a plot, 
type of land ownership, access to credit, revenue (farm income), and irrigation water 
significantly influenced cropland allocation decisions.  
The study recommends that government and policymakers develop agricultural policies and 
laws capacitate smallholder farmers to make informed production decisions, thereby improving 
farm incomes and welfare.  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Land and water resources are fundamental inputs for agricultural production and their 
management partly determines farm profitability (Sauer et al., 2008).  The resources are key 
for poverty alleviation and improving rural livelihood among smallholder irrigators 
(Namubiru-Mwaura, 2014). However, both are increasingly scarce due to land degradation 
emanating from increasing population growth and increasing competition for water resources 
from industrial sector (Purushothaman et al., 2013). This raises concerns about food security 
and the future for agricultural production. Agriculture is important for achieving food security 
and for an alternative way to realise income (Adjimoti, 2018).  
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Despite the scarcity of agricultural land and water, farmers have to remain in production to 
feed their families and an increasing population anticipated to double by 2050 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and developing countries (Nguyen et al., 2017; Amare et al., 2018). Farmers must find 
ways to balance opportunities against constraints and achieve maximum payoff (utility and/ 
profit). Hence, there is a need for farmers to intensify farming and to make informed choices 
about cropland allocation (Thamaga-Chitja & Hendriks, 2008; Ruoff, 2015). According to 
Dury et al. (2012) decisions that farmers make on crop-choices and land allocation determine 
both their short- and the long-run productivity and profitability. 
Generally, agricultural decisions are made under uncertainty and risks associated with 
anticipated future rainfall (which affects water availability for irrigation and water security), 
market (output) prices, changes in agricultural policies, an outbreak of pests and diseases 
(Thamaga-Chitja & Hendriks, 2008). Lack of trust between traders, government officials and 
farmers, and complex institutional structure create challenges for farmers to obtain accurate 
agricultural information which leads to uninformed decision making at farm level 
(Premarathne, 2012; Samaniego et al., 2017). Premarathne (2012) and Wood et al. (2014) 
asserted that perfect information on irrigation water availability, market prices and 
environmental risks from formal and informal institutions are essential for efficient resource 
allocation and increased adaptation. Changing norms and cultural aspects in the community 
further create uncertainties for farmers as it has been realised that informal institutional factors 
heavily influenced social behaviour and decisions in communities where livelihood is derived 
from agricultural activities is (Premarathne, 2012; Kuil et al., 2018).  
Farmers allocate their land among different crops based on resource availability. Where profit 
maximization is the primary objective, farmer decisions are motivated by expected revenue, 
affordability of necessary inputs (Sauer et al., 2008; Porgo et al., 2018). Hence, they rationalise 
to realise the desired utility level. In the irrigated crop production, farmers base their crop-
choice and land allocation decisions on the availability of irrigation water (Adjimoti, 2018). In 
Uganda, Ruoff (2015) found that optimized resource allocation varies strongly across farmers. 
It is therefore important to understand how farmers make decisions on resource allocation in 
their plots. 
Although biophysical factors are known to be principal factors influencing crop choices and 
land allocation decisions, institutional factors and agricultural policy (e.g. subsidy programs) 
should not be ignored as they also play an important role in cropland allocation decisions 
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(Ndhlovu, 2010). More attention has been put on agronomic factors, technical factors, etc while 
the effects of institutions on the performance of smallholder farmers have been overlooked 
(Moswetsi et al., 2017). This is indicated by minimal literature existing on the studies 
investigating the effects of governance on crop choice and land allocation decisions indicating 
the existence of a knowledge gap on this aspect.  Therefore, this study investigates the effects 
of governance and other factors on crop choice and land allocation decisions across in 
smallholder irrigation schemes in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, i.e., Mooi River, Tugela Ferry 
and Ndumo irrigation schemes.  
5.2 Governance and Cropland Allocation Decisions 
 
Although irrigation water has been widely recognised for its significant role in increasing 
production yields (Huh & Lall, 2013), its availability is the key driver of production decisions 
and the major limiting factor for agricultural development in many smallholder irrigation 
schemes (SISs) (Rahman, 2008; Duku et al., 2018; Moswetsi et al., 2017). A limited supply of 
water resources negatively affects the functioning of agricultural activities and translates to 
changes in land use patterns at the farm level (Ahmad, 2000). According to Sauer et al. (2008) 
and De Loe & Bjornlund (2010) the prevailing water scarcity and inefficiencies in agriculture 
results due to the absence of property rights and inadequate water pricing. Purushothaman et 
al. (2013) argued that the prevailing institutions in the agricultural sector, both at the national 
and farm level drive farm decisions that irrigators make. 
North (1999) cited by Murugani & Thamaga-Chitja (2018: 260) define institutions as “formal 
rules, informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of 
conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of both”. According to Global Water Partnership 
(GWP) (2017: 12), “governance refers to the system of actors, rules, mechanisms, and 
processes through which land and water are accessed, used, controlled, transferred, and related 
conflicts managed”. Irrigation schemes have both formal and informal institutions. However, 
the feasibility and effectiveness of governance depend on the level of stakeholder involvement 
(GWP, 2017). Land and water resources are fixed, allocable resources with institutions and 
governance governing the use of resources at scheme level (Anaba, 2016). 
Irrigators in SISs adopted irrigation scheduling as a tool for improving water use efficiency as 
it dictates the frequency of irrigation and the volume of water applied (Stevens, 2006). 
Irrigation scheduling often facilitates water use and management in irrigation schemes whereby 
irrigators take turns to irrigate (Agholor, 2014). Therefore, irrigators base their cropland 
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allocation decisions on the prevailing irrigation scheduling arrangement. According to Lamm 
et al. (1993), irrigation can either be constrained by physical water supply or institutional 
constraints which may force irrigators to reduce the amount of land under irrigation. Irrigators 
from Chakohwa and Nenhowe irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe revealed that the scheme 
irrigation water rules and practices affected their field activities and production decisions 
through the uncertainties of water availability (Samakande et al., 2002). 
Farmers consider the tenure status of their land when making farm decisions, particularly those 
involving investments in productivity-enhancing or soil conservation technology (Place & 
Otsuka, 2002). According to Agholor (2014), tenure security influences the short-term and 
long-term farmer decisions on land use and determine a household’s ability to remain in 
farming. Land tenure system and individual land rights under traditional authorities and 
customary laws are considered as weak and insecure. They distort farmer’s incentives to make 
substantial agricultural investments (Place & Otsuka, 2002; Adjimoti, 2018). Hence, modern, 
efficient and transparent land tenure system is essential (Adjimoti, 2018). This study postulates 
that governance on irrigation practices determine farmer’s crop choices.  
 
5.3 Methodology 
 
This section provides the research methods used in the study. It briefly describes the study area, 
sampling and data collection techniques, as well as data analyses.  
5.3.1 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework discussing the interaction between irrigators and governance in 
irrigation schemes have been provided in chapter 3, section 3.2.1. 
5.3.2 Study area 
The survey was undertaken in MRIS, TFIS in Msinga Local Municipality in uMmzinyathi 
District and NIS in Jozini Local Municipality in uMkhanyakude District. MRIS covers 
approximately 600 ha made up of 15 blocks, which serves about 850 irrigators. The scheme 
primarily depends on the Mooi River for water and uses the canal to convey water to the field. 
TFIS has the highest number of beneficiaries (1500 irrigators). It covers approximately 800 ha 
made up of 7 blocks. The scheme is fed by Tugela River and uses the canal, diesel, and electric 
pumps to convey water to the field. Finally, NIS is a relatively large irrigation scheme 
(approximately 1500 ha comprising of Phase 1 and 2) serving relatively fewer beneficiaries 
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(100 irrigators) compared to the other irrigation schemes. With respect to water abstraction, the 
scheme abstract water from Pongola River and convey it to the plots through an electric pump. 
All respondents in this study were irrigators, and all grew food crops. In MRIS potatoes, 
tomatoes, garlic and beans dominated the crops grown. Maize, potatoes, tomatoes and sweet 
potatoes were the most cultivated crops in TFIS. While in NIS major crops were chillies, 
cabbage, green pepper, beans, tomatoes and butternut (Survey data, 2018). Other vegetables 
such as onions, spinach, etc. were grown in a smaller portion of land for household 
consumption. The availability of the output market and the ability of the produce to increase 
household calorie availability and income informed the choice of crops grown in these 
irrigation schemes, especially in Msinga where farming is for subsistence. However, the land 
is a major limitation since farmers cannot acquire more land in the scheme. In MRIS irrigation 
water is another constraint due to the severity of water scarcity and lack of reliable water 
supply, particularly for tail end blocks in the scheme. 
5.3.3 Data collection methods and sampling techniques 
Data collection methods and sampling techniques used in the study were discussed in chapter 
3, section 3.2.2. However, in this chapter, only a sample of 259 (~11% of the population of 
irrigators) irrigators was drawn from the three irrigation schemes by selecting every seventh 
irrigator.  
5.3.4 Analytical framework 
Farmers have different aspirations and motives for engaging in farming (Mwaura & Adong, 
2016). While some consider farming as a business, others regard it as the main source of 
livelihood. This is because the farmers are both producers and consumers of agricultural 
production and therefore production and consumption decisions cannot be modelled in 
isolation as they are linked (Ndhlovu, 2010; Mwaura & Adong, 2016; Turner, 2014). 
Therefore, this study adopted the utility theory (Adjimoti, 2018), where the assumption is that 
all households want to maximize utility given the constraints and opportunities associated with 
their choices. 
Utility theory 
According to Ndhlovu (2010); Samaniego et al. (2017); Adjimoti (2018); Kuil et al. (2018); 
and other authors smallholder farmers seek to maximise their anticipated utility (U) which is a 
function of consumption of agricultural goods (X), consumption of purchased (non-
agricultural) goods (Y) and a function of leisure (H). The utility maximised is subject to cash 
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budget constraint which is the costs of consumption, determined by input (𝑃𝑥), output (𝑃𝑦) 
prices and transaction costs for buying (𝑇𝐶𝑏), is less than or equal to profits from non-
agricultural activities (𝜋𝑦) and profit from crop production, which is equal to this value of 
production (𝑃𝑥𝑄) minus the cost of inputs (𝑃𝑣𝑉), the transaction costs of selling agricultural 
goods (𝑇𝐶𝑏𝑦)  and buying agricultural inputs (𝑇𝐶𝑏𝑣). Farmers also face production constraint 
for which output is a function of farm labour (F), other variable inputs (V), land area (A), 
capital (K) and risk (𝜎). Moreover, the choices that farmers make are further constrained by 
time which limits the sum of farm labour, leisure and off-farm labour (O) to be less than time 
endowment T. X, Y and Q are non-negative values. This can generally be expressed as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑋, 𝑌, 𝐻): Utility maximization 
𝑃𝑥𝑋 + 𝑇𝐶𝑏𝑥 +  𝑃𝑦𝑌 + 𝑇𝐶𝑏𝑦  ≤  𝑃𝑥𝑄 − 𝑇𝐶𝑠𝑥 − 𝑃𝑣𝑉 −  𝑇𝐶𝑏𝑣 + 𝜋𝑦: Budget constraint 
𝑄 = 𝑓( 𝐹, 𝑉, 𝐴. 𝐾, 𝜎): Production constraint 
𝑇 = 𝐻 + 𝐹 + 𝑂: Time constraint 
𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑄 ≥ 0                                                                                                                               (1) 
The decisions on the share of land allocated to various crops will depend on all variables that 
lead to specialization in one crop or diversifying production to different crop enterprises. Such 
variables include inputs, labour, total land available, household’s socio-economic 
characteristics, expected prices, income generating activities, physical conditions in the area, 
transaction costs, risk 𝑎𝑛𝑑 profits from other activities (𝜋𝑦). 
The reduced form-land allocation function can generally be presented as follows: 
Reduced − form land allocation function ∶   𝑄𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝑉, 𝐴, 𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑇𝐶, 𝐻ℎ, 𝜋𝑦)        (2) 
5.3.5 Empirical Model 
Fractional Logit Generalised Linear Model  
Fractional response regression models (either logit, probit or hetprob) were identified as 
appropriate methods for analysing response variables that proportion in nature, that is, their 
values range between an interval of zero and one. However, Papke &Wooldridge (1996) and 
Baum (2008) criticised the use of fractional response models such as logit and probit as they 
impose the data constraint that the dependent variable must be coded as either 0 or 1. Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and Tobit regression models were also not suitable for estimating 
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proportions as they will generally yield senseless predictions for the extreme values (Baum, 
2008). They tend to ignore entries with zero, no land allocated to any crop (Samaniego et al., 
2017) Papke &Wooldridge (1996) and Baum (2008) then offered Fractional Logit Generalized 
Linear Model (FLGLM) as the most suitable and reliable method for modelling proportions. 
FLGLM fills the gap that the logit, probit and hetprob do not allow for fractional response 
models. According to Wooldridge & Papke (1996), the FLGLM is a quasi-likelihood method 
of estimating regression models with a fractional dependent variable. 
According to Papke & Wooldridge (1996), the FLGLM is a Generalised Linear Model with a 
binomial distribution and a logit link function) may be presented as follows:  
𝑔{𝐸(𝑦)}  =  𝑥𝛽, 𝑦 ~ 𝐹                                                                                                                    (3) 
where 𝑔(. ) is the link function and F is the distributional family.  
This becomes   𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 {𝐸(𝑦)}  =  𝑥𝛽, 𝑦 ~ 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖                                                       (4) 
Principal Components Analysis 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is a “multivariate technique with the central aim of 
reducing the dimensionality of a multivariate data set while accounting for as much of the 
original variation as possible” (Everitt & Hothorn, 2011: 61). It economizes on the number of 
variables without losing too much information and eliminates the possibility of 
multicollinearity by replacing the highly correlated variable with few uncorrelated PCs 
(Jolliffe, 1986). PCA has widely been applied in different subjects to generate indices such as 
asset index (Wood et al., 2014), water security index (Muchara, 2014) and other researchers. 
This study also applied PCA to generate governance indices and farmer’s perceptions of water 
governance that were used as explanatory variables in the FLGLM.  
The KMO, the measure of sampling adequacy is greater than 0.5 implying that data is suitable 
to be used in PCA (Table 1) (Kaiser & Rice, 1974). To retain the PCs the study applied the 
Kaiser criterion which suggests that PCs with eigenvalues greater than one must be retained.  
Two PCs were retained. Table 14 presents the retained PCs and the proportion of variation 
explained.  
The first PC explains 41.15% of the total variation in water governance. It describes the 
necessary instruments and bodies for ensuring sustainable use and management of water 
resources in SISs when satisfaction with irrigation schedule and constraints arising due to 
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irrigation scheduling move in an opposite direction. Hence, the PC was named water 
governance (WAT_GOVNC). The second PC explains 16.87% of the total variation in water 
governance. It describes farmers’ satisfaction with irrigation water schedule associated with 
satisfaction with the scheme committee in ensuring compliance to regulation on water uses and 
the cooperation between farmers in different Blocks. Hence, it is named farmer’ satisfaction 
with an irrigation schedule (SAT_IRRGSCHD). 
Table 14. Principal component analysis of the major indicators of scheme water governance 
 
Description of variables 
Principal Components 
PC1 PC2 
• Satisfaction with irrigation schedule -0.014 0.860 
• Constraints due to the current irrigation water law -0.260 - 0.708 
• The effectiveness of the constitution in water resource 
management 
0.650 0.181 
• The effectiveness of the scheme committee in ensuring 
compliance to regulation on water uses 
0.717 0.300 
• Satisfaction with the cooperation between farmers in 
different blocks 
0.519 0.498 
• Farmer participation in formulating irrigation water 
schedule 
0.769 -0.060 
Eigenvalue 2.469 1.013 
Variance explained 41.150 16.877 
Cumulative percentage of variation explained 58.027 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy 0.776 
Bartlett's test of sphericity ~𝜒2  = 243.582*** 
Note: Component loadings greater than |0.40|are highlighted in bold print 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
5.3.6 Description of variables 
Dependent variable 
The proportion of land allocated to various crops (LAND_ALLOC) was used as a proxy for 
cropland allocation decisions. It was computed as 𝑃𝑖  =  
𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖
                           (5) 
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Where 𝑃𝑖 is the proportion of land cultivated by i
th irrigator in winter season where water is 
scarce; Ai is the area cultivated in winter by an i
th irrigator; while 𝐹𝑖 is the area fallowed; for i 
= 1, 2, …, n (number of irrigators) (Malik & Singh, 2002). The index of land allocation ranges 
between the zero – one interval, where a share of 0 means imply that nothing was allocated on 
a given land area while 1 means that the total landholding was fully cultivated. A value above 
1 is empirically impossible (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996; McCord, 2015; Cobourn et al., 2017).  
 Factors influencing cropland allocation decisions 
Studies conducted on crop choice and land allocation decisions specifically assessing factors 
influencing land-use intensity, crop diversification, crop choices, cropland allocation decisions, 
etc in different countries used different approaches and empirical models to estimate the 
relationships. The statistically significant drivers of crop-choice and cropland allocation 
decisions at the farm level were: 
o Level of education, farming experience, farm asset ownership and off-farm income 
(Rahman, 2008); 
o Average home to plot distance in km, consumer-worker ratio, female labour, total 
household livestock units, a log of household total real asset value, the degree of land 
fragmentation, region, and access to fertilizer subsidy (Ndhlovu, 2010);  
o Amount received from leasing, value adding to products, annual farm income, savings, 
skills pertaining to farming activities and the proportion of farm inputs purchased with 
the farmer’s own money (Tshilowa, 2015); 
o Household location within sub-regions, size of cultivated land, distance to output 
markets and education levels of household head (Mwaura & Adonga, 2016); 
o Age, education, land size, agricultural labour, distance, infrastructure, credit access and 
dependency ratio (Nguyen et al., 2017); and  
o Weather shocks (particularly rainfall), household characteristics, plot characteristics 
and road accessibility (Amare et al., 2018). 
 
Empirical evidence on studies conducted on land allocation decisions informed the choice of 
explanatory variables included in the analysis. These variables can have a negative or positive 
effect on land allocation decisions. The effects of governance on land allocations differ among 
irrigators due to heterogeneity existing among irrigators in terms of their vulnerability and 
resilience. Therefore, heterogeneity in farmers with regards to household assets and wealth 
provide adaptation strategies for farmers (Wood et al., 2014). Murugani & Thamaga-Chitja 
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(2018) pointed out five types of assets: natural assets (land, water quantity and quality); 
physical assets (tools and equipment, transportation, roads, buildings, technology and 
communication); financial assets (credit); human assets (skills, knowledge, capacity for value 
chain activities and labour power; and social assets (group membership and relationships of 
trust and reciprocity, linkages to buyers and service providers, and linkages to decision 
makers). Based on the empirical evidence and literature reviewed the study used the 
explanatory variables described in Table 15 as the key drivers of cropland allocation decisions. 
Table 15. Description and a prior expectation of the explanatory variables included in the 
regression analysis 
Variable name Description  Expected 
effect 
Dependent variable  
LAND_ALLOC An index of the proportion of land allocated to various crops  
 
Explanatory variables 
 
AGE The age of an irrigator (continuous: years) +/- 
GENDER The gender of an irrigator (dummy: 1= male, 0= otherwise) + 
EDUC_LEVEL The level of education an irrigator has obtained 
(categorical: 1= no formal, 2= primary, 3= secondary, 4= 
tertiary) 
+ 
HHOLD_MEMB The number of household members (continuous)  +  
LAND_SIZE The total amount of land held  + 
LOCATION   Local Municipality where the irrigation scheme is located 
(dummy:  1 = Jozini, 0 = Msinga) 
+ 
ACCESS_CRED Whether an irrigator have access to credit (dummy: 0 = No, 
1 =Yes) 
+ 
REVENUE 
 
The amount of income received from irrigated farming 
(continuous: Rands per season) 
+ 
WATSUFFCNY Farmer perceptions on whether the amount of irrigation 
water received was sufficient for crop requirement (Likert 
scale: 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= neutral; 4= 
agree; 5= strongly agree) 
+ 
WAT_GOVNC  Water governance (index) - 
SAT_IRRGSCHD Satisfaction with irrigation schedule (index) + 
Source: Agholor (2014); Chirigo (2014); Mdletshe (2014) 
72 
 
Age: Age is an important element in the farm decision-making process. Older farmers are 
better-equipped with farming skills, more familiar with the physical environment surrounding 
farming and can easily evaluate available opportunities (Agholor, 2014; Chirigo, 2014). 
Bembridge (1984) cited in Agholor (2014) state that as the age increases, farmers become more 
reluctant to change and stick to conservative methods. On the contrary, younger farmers adapt 
easily to changes either on the environment or agricultural institutions as they are willing to 
adopt new innovations. Hence, age is likely to positively or negatively influence cropland 
allocation decisions. 
Gender: Gender of an irrigator is generally associated with accessibility of agricultural 
resources and knowledge, and socio-cultural norms in patriarchal countries create gender 
discrepancies in agricultural information access (Lamontagne-Godwin et al., 2018). Hence, 
men are more resilient to shocks and easily adapted to changing environments than women.  
Holding other factors constant, male irrigators are less likely to allocate more land into 
cultivation under unfavourable conditions than women. 
Level of education: The level of education acquired is a vital element that enables farmers to 
make informed decisions relating to input selection, crop choice and cropping pattern 
(Ndhlovu, 2010; Chirigo, 2014; Dossah & Mohammed, 2016). Farmers with a higher level of 
education tend to explore widely the pathways of getting information about agriculture, 
expected price and profitability, and the use of modern technologies such as new seed varieties 
and fertilizers in order to expand their product portfolios (Ndhlovu, 2010; Chirigo, 2014). 
However, educated farmers people make decisions not to use land when the situation will not 
realise meaningful production. Hence, irrigators with a high level of education are less likely 
to allocate more land into cultivation where water stresses are high, ceteris paribus. 
Household size: Household size affects land allocation in two ways, that is, food demand and 
labour. Household size can be used as a proxy for the availability of family labour to work on 
the farm since smallholder farmers heavily rely on family labour to carry out agricultural 
activities (Mdletshe, 2014; Dossah & Mohammed, 2016). An additional household member 
increases food requirement and the scale of production must increase (Porgo et al., 2018). 
Hence, an increase in household size increases the proportion of land cultivated, ceteris paribus. 
Land size: An increase in land size generally increases the proportion of land allocated to 
alternative crops. However, it can also have negative effects on different crops due to limited 
production resource (Ndhlovu, 2010). The hypothesis in this study is that irrigators with 
73 
 
relatively larger land holdings are more likely to allocate a large proportion of their land to 
various crops, holding other factors unchanged.  
Access to credit: Credit plays in agricultural production as it allows farmers to secure inputs 
on time and to finance improved seed varieties (Chirigo, 2014). Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that irrigators with access to credit are anticipated to cultivate a large proportion of their land 
relative to their counterparts. 
Revenue: Farmers make decisions to allocate their scarce resources based on relative market 
prices and expected revenue and are said to be motivated by the amount of profit that can be 
maximized from certain crops (Sauer et al., 2008; Allen, 2012; Porgo et al., 2018). Higher 
revenue irrigators are able to use profit in search for and adoption of possible strategies to 
overcome water scarcity problems. Hence, irrigators who obtained higher revenue from the 
previous season compared to their counterparts will allocate larger proportions of land into 
cultivation, ceteris paribus. 
Location of an irrigation scheme: The location variable is used as a proxy for unobserved 
biophysical factors in the two areas, for example, the severity of water scarcity. The location 
also represents differences in farm sizes and governance regimes. The study anticipates that 
irrigators in the area where there are favourable biophysical conditions for farming will allocate 
more land into cultivation. 
Water sufficiency: The availability and distribution of irrigation water that sufficiently meets 
crop water requirement at various growth stages indicate efficiency in water allocation and 
enable farmers to increase land cultivated (Basiri, 2009). Therefore, a positive association 
between water sufficiency and land allocation decisions is anticipated. 
Water governance and irrigation water law: SISs use communal water for irrigation which 
is regarded as a common pool resource (McCord, 2017). For better management of water; 
efficient and sustainable use of irrigation water, irrigators agree with scheme leaders on the 
irrigation arrangement that reflects fairness in water accessibility. Irrigators who are satisfied 
with irrigation schedule (irrigation water law) will continue farming and allocate more cropland 
into farming relative to their counterparts, ceteris paribus. Irrigation can either be constraint by 
physical water supply or institutional constraints which may force irrigators to reduce the 
amount of land under irrigation (Lamm et al., 1993). Therefore, holding other factors 
unchanged, favourable water governance is anticipated to have a positive effect on cropland 
allocation decisions. 
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5.4 Results and Discussion 
 
This study employed both the descriptive statistics and econometric model to analyse data. 
While the descriptive statistical technique was used to summarize data using mean, frequencies 
and chi-squared (𝜒2 ) tests, the FLGLM was applied to estimate the effects of governance and 
other factors on cropland allocation decisions across gender and intergenerational dimensions. 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Household Characteristics 
MRIS and TFIS were dominated by female and elderly irrigators as reflected in Table 16. The 
average of irrigators was 57 and 55 years in MRIS and TFIS, respectively. In addition, most 
irrigators in MRIS and TFIS had no formal education, very few had reached the high school 
level. On the contrary, NIS was dominated by male and young irrigators. The average age of 
irrigators in the scheme was 46 years. Most irrigators had acquired formal and a considerable 
percentage had reached high school and tertiary level education. 
 
Table 16. The distribution of age and education level across irrigation schemes 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
Irrigation Scheme  
𝜒2 MRIS (n= 120) TFIS (n= 105) NIS (n= 34) 
Gender Female (%) 84.2 86.7 32.4 *** 
Male (%) 15.8 13.3 67.6 
 
Age group 
(years) 
21-35 (%) 21.7 22.9 47.1 ** 
36-56 (%) 23.3 27.6 23.5 
57-69 (%) 23.3 26.7 17.6 
70-88 (%) 31.7 22.9 11.8 
            
Education 
level 
No formal (%) 64.7 55.2 23.5 *** 
Primary (%) 19.3 32.4 23.5 
High school (%) 13.4 12.4 32.4 
Tertiary (%) 2.5 0.0  20.6 
Note: ***= p <0.01; **= p <0.05 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
Land  
In line with Murugani & Thamaga-Chitja (2018) women constituted the largest proportion of 
irrigators yet occupy relatively small land sizes while men had and relatively few of them 
occupied land registered in their names. Most of them use land registered in their male kins’ 
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names. In this study, women had a mean land size of 0.49 ha while it was 2.16 ha for men. 
With respect to land ownership, most men (77.7%) occupied land registered in their names 
relative to women (43.3%).  
Access to credit 
Most irrigators across the study irrigation schemes could assess credit to finance their 
production (49.2% (MRIS); 62.9% (TFIS); 76.5% (NIS)).  However, most of them relied on 
the informal institution. About 41.7%, 20.0% and 3.8% irrigators from NIS, TFIS and MRIS, 
respectively who could secure credit from formal financial sources. This was due to the lack 
of collateral among farmers as they lack ownership of the land they held. According to 
Murugani & Thamaga-Chitja (2018), lack of collateral impedes the chances for farmers to 
acquire financial assistance from Banks.  
 
Water governance 
Irrigation water availability and accessibility were not uniform across the study irrigation 
schemes due to differences in the irrigation infrastructure used, the prevailing irrigation water 
law (irrigation schedule) or the severity of water shortage in the area. MRIS irrigators received 
relatively less water than the other irrigation schemes. On average, irrigators from MRIS, TFIS 
and NIS received water once a week, twice a week and 5 days per week, respectively. 
Moreover, only 23.3% irrigators from MRIS who perceive the amount of water received as 
adequate for their crop requirements while 93.3% and 97.1% from TFIS and NIS, respectively.  
 
With reference to Table 17, most irrigators across the study irrigation schemes were satisfied 
with the irrigation schedule, had no constraints with the irrigation schedule except in MRIS 
(40.0% (MRIS); 17.1% (TFIS) & 11.8% (NIS)), and perceived that informal irrigation water 
law influences their decisions on resource allocation and cropping patterns. Moreover, 
irrigation water law was perceived as effective in managing water resources in the schemes. 
The responses from irrigators showed statistically significant variations across irrigation 
schemes, implying that the effects of irrigation water law differ across.  
 
The statistically significant influence of irrigation water law in resource allocation and 
cropping pattern associated with household resource endowments has led to poor land 
utilization during the times when water stresses are high. Results obtained from the household 
survey showed that 69.3% irrigators cultivated their land, although not all of them utilised their 
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land at full capacity. While 30.1% of irrigators had nothing in their fields during the study. 
However, it cannot be inferred that this was due to irrigation water law and governance. The 
fallowed land can also be due to the household’s lack of resources or vulnerability to shocks. 
Table 17. Farmer perceptions on the influence of informal irrigation water law across irrigation 
schemes 
Farmer’s response SD D N A SA 𝜒2 
 Satisfaction with irrigation schedule (%)  
Irrigation 
scheme 
MRIS (n=120) 20.8 31.7 10.8 30.0 6.7 *** 
TFIS (n=105) 0.0 3.8 4.8 55.2 36.2 
NIS (n=34) 0.0 3.0 15.2 63.6 18.2 
 Irrigation water law is effective in managing water resources (%)  
Irrigation 
scheme 
MRIS (n=120) 4.2 12.5 25.0 45.8 12.5 * 
TFIS (n=105) 1.0 13.3 19.0 43.8 22.9 
NIS (n=34) 0.0 12.1 15.2 66.7 6.1 
 Irrigation water law influence resource allocation decisions (%)  
Irrigation 
scheme 
MRIS (n=120) 4.2 11.7 24.2 42.5 17.5 ** 
TFIS (n=105) 1.9 17.1 15.2 38.1 27.6 
NIS (n=34) 3.0 18.2 15.2 60.6 3.0 
  Irrigation water law influence cropping pattern (%)  
Irrigation 
scheme 
MRIS(n=120) 0.8 15.8 14.2 45.0 24.2 *** 
TFIS(n=105) 3.8 21.9 10.5 27.6 36.2 
NIS (n=34) 0.0 27.3 18.2 54.5 0.0 
Note: ***= p <0.01; **= p <0.05; *= p <0.10 
SD= Strongly Disagree; D= Disagree; N= Neutral; A= Agree; SA= Strongly Agree 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
 
5.4.2 Econometric results for the effects of governance on crop allocation in smallholder 
irrigation schemes 
The VIF used to diagnose multicollinearity among explanatory variables indicated that 
multicollinearity was not a serious problem since all VIF values were below 10 (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). While heteroscedasticity was automatically corrected for in the model by 
employing robust standard errors. The estimated Wald chi-squared statistics indicated that the 
estimated FLGLM model was statistically significant at one percent level, implying that the 
explanatory variables included in the model jointly explain the variation in the proportion of 
land allocated to various crops during the periods of water insecurity. Moreover, five variables 
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out of the eleven included in the model were statistically significant in explaining land 
allocation decisions. Hence, the model as a whole makes statistical sense. 
Out of the eleven variables included in the model, five variables (age of an irrigator (AGE), 
land size (LAND_SIZE), access to credit (ACCESS_CRED), expected revenue (REVENUE) 
and water sufficiency (WATSUFFNCY)) were found to have a statistically significant 
influence on land allocation decisions, while the rest of the variables had no effect. Of the five 
statistically significant variables, the coefficient estimates of ACCESS_CRED, REVENUE 
and WATSUFFNCY had positive signs, implying that an increase in either of these variables 
encourages irrigators to allocate a large proportion of their land into cultivation of various 
crops. While the estimated coefficients of the other two variables (AGE and LAND_SIZE) had 
negative signs, implying that an increase in either of these variables reduces the proportion of 
land allocated to various crops. Table 18 presents the results obtained from the FLGLM differ 
across the three irrigation schemes in the effects, magnitude and significance.   
Table 18. Estimates of the Fractional Logit Generalized Linear Model (n= 259) 
LAND_ALLOC Coefficient Robust Std. Error VIF 
AGE -0.018** 0.009 1.38 
GENDER -0.320NS 0.295 1.37 
EDUC_LEVEL -0.133NS 0.157 1.54 
HHOLD_MEMB 0.015NS 0.025 1.12 
LOCATION 0.603NS 0.601 3.44 
LAND_SIZE -0.183** 0.090 3.02 
ACCESS_CRED 0.430** 0.216 1.10 
REVENUE 0.000*** 3.98e-06 1.55 
WATSUFFNCY 0.295*** 0.108 1.79 
WAT_GOVNC 0.027NS 0.101 1.10 
SAT_IRRGSCHD -0.158NS 0.137 1.71 
Cons -2.214* 1.345 Mean VIF: 1.73 
Wald 𝜒2 33.43 
Prob > 𝜒2 0.0010 
Pseudo R2 0.0571 
Note: ***= p <0.01; **= p <0.05; *= p <0.10; NS= not statistically significant 
Source: Survey data (2018) 
Age 
As expected, the estimated coefficient of age was negative and statistically significant at p< 
0.50. The regression results forecast that for a unit increase in the age of an irrigator the 
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proportion of land allocated decreases by 0.018, ceteris paribus. Although older farmers tend 
to have more farming experience than younger farmers, they are less adaptable to 
environmental changes compared to younger farmers who are more willing to explore and 
productivity improving adopt innovations (Mdletshe, 2014). During the periods of irrigation 
water insecurity, younger irrigators can easily adopt drought resistant cultivars. During focus 
group discussion it was observed that older irrigators treasure indigenous farming methods and 
are most of them are reluctant to change. Extension officers in Msinga also confirmed this. 
Hence, during the periods of irrigation water insecurity older irrigators are less likely to allocate 
their fixed land input into cultivation of various crops.  
Land size 
The size of land held by an irrigator was statistically significant p< 0.05 and negatively related 
to cropland allocation decisions across irrigation schemes. The model predicts that, for a unit 
increase in the land size, the proportion of land allocated to various crops decreases by 0.183, 
ceteris paribus. Small landholding in SISs is one of the limiting factors for the expansion of 
agricultural production (De & De, 2005). The negative sign in the estimated coefficient could 
be attributed to the prevailing challenge of unavailability of irrigated land in the scheme. 
Irrigators who wants to expand their crop production are limited by land since they cannot 
acquire additional irrigated plots in the scheme since land trading is not permissible and renting 
of land is insignificant across these irrigation schemes. In addition, Muchara (2014) argued that 
increasing irrigated land size for crop production increases the demand for reliable water supply 
which is another limitation for increasing the proportion of land allocated into cultivation of 
various crops during the period of water shortages. Hence, with small land sizes and limited 
chances of acquiring additional irrigated as the study findings indicated, irrigators are less 
likely allocate more land to various crops, instead they will intensify and allocate available land 
to a single crop that maximizes their utility.  
Access to credit 
As expected, the estimated coefficient of access to credit (ACCESS_CRED) was positive and 
statistically significant at p < 0.50. Irrigators with access to credit are more likely to allocate 
land to various crops compared to irrigators without access to credit by 0.430, ceteris paribus. 
This suggests that irrigators access to credit leads to more access to land to the irrigators when 
controlling other variable Access to credit allows farmers to secure necessary agricultural 
inputs and innovative productivity improving technologies (Chirigo, 2014). However, 
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smallholder irrigators cannot access to credit from formal financial institutions due to lack of 
collateral (Yobe, 2016).   
Revenue 
In general, relative prices play a central role in determining crop choices and decisions on the 
proportion of land to allocate to profitable crops. Higher market prices for farm produce act as 
motivation for farmers to remain in production and produce more, although these prices can 
change in the long run (De & De, 2005; Agholor, 2014). In this study, the estimated coefficient 
of REVENUE was found positive and statistically significant at p < 0.01, as expected. The 
model predicts that for a unit increase in farm income obtained in the previous season, the 
proportion of land allocated to various crops increases, holding other factors constant. Revenue 
is a product of output price and the yield, hence farmers as producers are attracted by previous 
higher output prices and higher yields and allocate a large proportion of land to more profitable 
crops (De & De, 2005). Unfortunately, smallholder farmers have no or limited access to market 
information and make production decisions without this important information (Premarathne, 
2012; Wood et al., 2014). 
Water sufficiency 
The estimated coefficient of water sufficiency (WATSUFFNCY) was positive and statistically 
significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that irrigators with irrigation plots where water supply is 
sufficient for cropping requirements are more likely to allocate land to various crops compared 
to irrigators with irrigation plots where there is insufficient water supply, by 0.295. Most 
irrigation schemes face the challenge of inadequate water supply partly due to outdated 
irrigation infrastructure and erratic rainfall pattern but mostly due to inefficient use of irrigation 
water. These results are not surprising because during the household survey most irrigators 
revealed that if the water supply is not disrupted by other irrigators upstream, it is sufficient for 
their cropping requirements. Such claims about inadequate water supply were an issue of 
uncalled for behaviour of fellow irrigators resulting from the prevailing global water shortages. 
De & De (2005) inferred that adequate and timely availability of rainfall and irrigation 
encourages irrigators to expand crop production. Basiri (2009) and Agholor (2014) also found 
a positive association between water sufficiency and land allocation decisions.  
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Gender 
The estimated coefficient of gender had a negative association with the proportion of land 
allocated to various crops. However, this relationship was not statistically significant. This can 
be attributed to the dominance of female irrigators in the study sample. Holding other factors 
constant, women have relatively less capital to purchase farm inputs and productivity 
improving technologies. Also, the degree of land accessibility is lower than that of men. Hence, 
they are likely to allocate less land into cultivation by 0.320 compared to their male 
counterparts. Ndhlovu (2010) found that women cultivated relatively less crops on their plots 
compared to men. Another justification for this could be the fact that most women occupy land 
that is not theirs, hence allocate their resources in fear that they will be chased out whenever 
the owner wants the land back. 
 
Perceptions of water governance and satisfaction with irrigation water schedule 
The estimated coefficients of farmer perceptions of water governance and satisfaction with an 
irrigation schedule in the scheme were not statistically significant at neither one, five or ten 
percent level. The positive association with the farmer perceptions of water governance imply 
that the scheme water governance dimensions were effective in managing water resources. 
Governance did not impose limitations on land allocation decisions unlike in SISs in Limpopo 
province who were affected by institutional framework governing agriculture (Machete et al., 
2004).  
On the contrary, the irrigation schedule discouraged farmers to allocate more proportion of 
land to various crops. This is supported by most irrigators across who indicated that their 
decisions on resource allocation and cropping pattern were influenced by irrigation water laws 
in the scheme. The effects of irrigation water law were more severe at the tail-end blocks in 
MRIS where the amount of water received was not enough for their cropping requirements. 
Moreover, some irrigators revealed that they were cultivating their land at a loss as their crops 
were not getting water. Irrigators also revealed that they had to sleep on the mountains ensuring 
that all canal gates were closed in order to be able to irrigate on the next day.  
The two variables had no statistically significant effect on land allocation decisions because 
most of the irrigators from all the study irrigation schemes were satisfied with the scheme 
governance of water resource and the prevailing irrigation schedule in the scheme and had no 
constraints with the irrigation water law. In addition, most irrigators across the study irrigation 
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schemes perceived water governance dimensions in the scheme to be effective in managing 
water resources.  
5.5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Although the decisions on land use revolve around irrigation water availability and other 
biophysical factors, institutional factors should not be overlooked as they provide smallholder 
farmers with an opportunity to expand product portfolio by ensuring sustainable use of the 
scheme resources. However, irrigation water laws designed in SISs can also create constraints 
to farmer performance by restricting the abstraction of irrigation water at any times other than 
those agreed on as a scheme. The decline in the limited supply of water imposes a challenge 
for irrigators to optimally allocate land and water resources to various crops and other uses.  
Based on the results obtained, the study concludes that water governance dimensions did not 
influence cropland allocation decisions in MRIS, TFIS and NIS, and therefore recommends 
that government and policymakers develop agricultural policies and laws capacitate 
smallholder farmers to make informed production decisions, thereby improving farm incomes 
and welfare.   
5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter addressed the final objective of the study which investigates the effects of water 
governance on cropland allocation decisions in Mooi River, Tugela Ferry and Ndumo irrigation 
scheme using the FLGLM. Three variables (water sufficiency, access to credit and revenue) 
had a positive and significant influence on cropland allocation decisions. While the age of 
irrigator and the land size had a negative influence. In addition, there was no statistically 
significant difference between cropland allocation decisions made by men and women. The 
following chapter summarises the main findings of the study and provides policy 
recommendations drawn from the study.   
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Smallholder irrigation schemes face several challenges hindering them from performing at 
satisfactory levels. Among the challenges faced is the limited irrigation water supply emanating 
from scheme governance problems, with weak institutional arrangements that fail to equitably 
and effectively govern water resources. Unequal distribution of land resources and unequal 
representation of women in water management and decision-making processes has been noted 
across gender and intergenerational dimensions. Consequently, the effects of water scarcity 
vary across the two dimensions, leaving women and youth vulnerable. Hence, this study sought 
to assess the effects of the interactions between intergenerational and gender dimensions with 
governance on the performance of irrigators in SIS, in SA. This was carried out through the 
following specific objectives: to assess the institutional arrangements for water management in 
SISs; to identify the determinants of farmer awareness of water governance dimensions across 
intergenerational and gender dimensions in SISs, and to investigate the effects of governance 
dimensions on cropland allocation decisions in SISs. 
To achieve the objectives of the study, primary data was collected among 274 irrigators from 
MRIS, TFIS and NIS, and was analysed using different methodologies. The descriptive 
statistical technique was used to assess the institutional and organisational arrangements for 
water management in SISs. To identify the determinants of farmer awareness of water 
governance dimensions across intergenerational and gender dimensions in SISs, PCA and OLS 
were applied. While FLGLM was employed to investigate the effects of governance on 
cropland allocation in SISs.  
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The study found that formal institutions such as NWA, NWRS, etc. were not known and WUAs 
were non-existent at scheme level. This resulted in high dependence on informal institutions 
for scheme and irrigation management across the study irrigation schemes. Factors found to be 
significant determinants of farmer awareness of water governance dimensions included 
household characteristics (gender and level of education), scheme location, membership in 
WUAs, stakeholder participation and farmer’s involvement in scheme decision-making 
processes. On the other hand, the age of an irrigator, access to credit, land size, revenue and 
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irrigation water sufficiency significantly influenced irrigator’s cropland allocation decisions in 
SISs. 
The study, therefore, concludes that; 
• Although, the studied irrigation schemes had functional institutional arrangements 
They relied on informal institutions for scheme and water management with the scheme 
committee overseeing water management activities. Irrigators did everything on their 
own with minimal or no government assistance, which is recommended as the SISs are 
in the IMT era.  
• Men were more aware of both formal and informal institutions than women. With 
respect to the intergenerational dimension, there was no statistically significant 
difference in the awareness of both formal and informal water institutions between 
young and elderly irrigators. 
• Water governance had no effect on cropland allocation decisions in the study irrigation 
schemes. This is because farmers, on average, were satisfied with irrigation law and 
perceived water governance dimensions to effective in water resource management. 
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
The dominance of elderly farmers in the agricultural sector requires alternative ways to attract 
young minds in order to maximise the potential of the sector and make it economically viable. 
Although women are considered as primary users of land and water resources and the major 
food producers, they remain highly dependent on men for land and other productive resources 
since men have control over resources. Traditional norms often disregard the potential of 
women as farmers and decision makers and thus prevent them from participating in public 
organizations and in decision-making processes. Moreover, men in rural areas are regarded as 
leaders, hence, it is important to educate them. Therefore, to empower women, customary laws 
need to be adjusted to give men and women, youth and elderly equal privileges and 
opportunities especially with regards to land accessibility and control over resources. Land 
should be made equally available for both genders, and young girls should also be allowed to 
inherit land, especially those interested in agriculture. This could improve the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP because youth have innovative ideas and easily adaptto changes than elderly 
farmers. 
84 
 
Although both formal and informal institutions are essential for effective management of water 
resources, irrigators perceived informal institutions as more relevant to their needs and thus 
tend to attract greater compliance than formal institutions. Therefore, it is important that 
policymakers investigate the effectiveness of informal institutions on water resource 
management and incorporate customary laws when formulating national laws. Informal 
institutions which are functional, recognised and in line with irrigation management transfer 
should be strengthened. Farmers should also be encouraged to deal with scheme matters on 
their own without relying on government. Moreover, farmer awareness on water policies, 
government aims, and programmes implemented for effective management of water resources 
should be improved in order to increase their compliance with formal institutions.  
 
6.4 Study Limitations 
It was difficult to obtain precise information on the size of land held, the area planted and other 
production data due to recalling problem. Despite the study limitations, the research findings 
and conclusions will help policymakers review whether the policies they have formulated are 
communicated to the local level, whether smallholder farmers understand these policies and 
their aims, what has been the impact of these policies to smallholder farmers as well as what 
improvements can be made to ensure that the intended aims of the water policies are attained 
in the future. 
 
6.5 Areas for Future Research 
The limited availability of literature on the effects of institutional arrangements, smallholder 
performance and on the interactions between governance, intergenerational and gender 
dimensions on SISs indicates that there is much scope for future research to fill the institutional 
gap existing on the analyses of SISs. Further research should investigate the effects of water 
governance dimensions smallholder economic performance since not much has been done on 
this aspect. 
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APPENDIX 1: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
 School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
Discipline of Agricultural Economics 
 
Effects of interactions between governance, intergenerational and gender dimensions on 
smallholder irrigation scheme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 
Note: All the information provided in this questionnaire is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and will be 
used for research purposes by staff and students at the University of KwaZulu Natal and Water Research 
Commission. There is no right or wrong answer to these questions. Moreover, participation in the survey 
is VOLUNTARY and NO FINANCIAL BENEFITS are paid during or after participation. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Household name Municipality District Date 
    
Irrigation scheme Block Interviewer’s 
name 
Name of 
Respondent 
    
*Municipality: 1= Jozini Local, 2= Msinga Local 
*District: 1= Umzinyathi, 2= Umkhanyakude  
*Irrigation scheme: 1=Mooi River, 2= Tugela Ferry, 3=Makhathini, 4= Ndumo 
 
A: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS (INFORMATION ABOUT THE IRRIGATOR TO BE 
ENTERED BELOW) (circle the appropriate) 
 
A1. Age     Gender: 1=M   0=F Marital status: 1=Single 2=Married 3=Divorced  4=Widowed 
A2. Education 1=No formal         2=Primary       3=High School         4= Tertiary  
A3. Main occupation 1=Farmer 2=Regular salaried job 3=Temporary job 4=Unemployed 5=Self 
employed 6=Student 7=Retired  8=Other (Specify) 
A4. Total number of household members   
A5. How many of the household members are adults/children?   
A6. How many of the household members work on the farm?  
A7. Do you hire labour to work on the farm? 1= Yes, 0= No  
* Household head refers to the household head that stays in the household for 4 or more days per 
week  
** Please include only those who stay in the household for 3 or more days per week 
 
B: TRAINING 
B1. What training have you had? 
Training  1=Yes; 0=No Training provider 
Agriculture   
Irrigation   
Water management   
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B2. Which training did you find most useful on the farm?........................................................ 
B3. If no in any of the above, do you need training? 1=Yes; 0=No 
C. ASSET OWNERSHIP 
C1. Household asset: Indicate agricultural production assets that you have access to: 
Asset Quantity/ Number of 
items owned 
Do you consider the production assets you have to be 
adequate for your Agricultural Activities: 1= Yes; 
0=No 
Water Pump    
Ox-drawn plough   
Wheelbarrow   
Trailer   
Tractor   
Tractor-drawn plough   
Vehicle   
Cattle   
Goats   
Other   
C2. Are there any production assets supplied by the government? 1= Yes, 0= No 
C2.1 If yes which ones: ………………………………………………………………............. 
 
D. LAND OWNERSHIP AND UTILIZATION 
Land type Ownership Estimated area utilized The proportion of area 
not utilized 
Homestead garden     
Dry-land fields    
Irrigation plots inside 
the scheme 
   
Irrigation plots outside 
the scheme 
   
* ownership:1=Traditional allocation; 2=Rented; 3=State supplied/owned; 4=Inherited 5=Owned 
6=Given by relative 7= Other 
Is it in your name? 1= Yes; 0= No  
D1. How far is your homestead from the irrigation scheme?  
D2. Do you pay for land (if leased)? Yes=1 No=0  (Rands)  
      D2.1. Are you satisfied with the fees you pay for land? Yes=1; No=0  
D3. How do you feel about your land size? 1=Too small 2=Just right 3=Too large  
D4 Rate the quality of your land for crop production 0=Poor 1=Average 2=Good 
• Water holding capacity  
• Drainage capacity  
• Resilience to degradation and unfavourable conditions  
• Low weed pressure  
• Sufficient nutrient supply  
• Salinity problems  
D5. Are you satisfied with the tenure security of your land? Yes=1 No=0  
D5.1. Are you permitted to sell land? Yes=1 No=0  
D5.2 Are you permitted to rent your irrigated piece of land? Yes=1 No=0  
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E. SCHEME GOVERNANCE 
E1. Please answer the following questions regarding the governance of SIS’s 
1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree 
I am aware of the National Water Act of South Africa  
I am aware or have heard of the Natural Water Resource Strategy of SA  
I know what the government aims to achieve in SIS  
I know that I have to have a water licence to use irrigation water  
I am satisfied with how the land is allocated in SIS   
The terms of land allocation should change to suit farmer needs  
The rules regarding water allocation in the scheme are fair  
The rules set within the irrigation scheme are fair  
The rules in the scheme are hard to enforce  
Penalties for failure to comply with the rules are fair  
I am satisfied with the cooperation between blocks and farmers in the irrigation scheme  
Water users are always willing to contribute to the maintenance of infrastructure and 
equipment in the scheme 
 
I am satisfied with how water conflicts are managed in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of the Tribal Authority in the irrigation scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of the DAFF in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of the DRDLR in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of the DWAS in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of the government departments in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of NGOs in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the involvement of Farmers in making the rules  
I am satisfied with the current executive committee  
The election process of the executive committee is fair   
I am satisfied with the contribution of the traditional council in irrigation management  
I am satisfied with the traditional council’s level of understanding of the rule in the 
irrigations scheme 
 
I am satisfied with the level of contribution of the traditional council in rule enforcement  
I am satisfied with the way that the farmers and traditional authorities work in the scheme  
I am satisfied with the youth’s involvement in irrigation scheme management  
I am satisfied with the youth's level of understanding of the rules of the scheme  
In your opinion, why is the youth not actively participating in farming 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
E3. IRRIGATION WATER LAW 
Questions Response 
1. Do you have water rights?  1= Yes     0= No    2= I do not know  
2. If Yes, in what form?  1= Water Licence; 2= Water permit; 3=Other, 
Specify………………….  
 
3. Do you have any constraints with due to the current irrigation water law(s)? 
1=Yes 0= No  
3.1. If Yes, what …………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. My access to water is secure 
1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree 
 
5. Have you experienced water conflicts in the past 12 months? 1= Yes   0= No                
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5.1. Between farmers  
5.2. Between blocks  
5.3. Between cooperatives  
5.4  If Yes above, what were the causes? 
5.5 If Yes in 5 were the problems solved? 
5.6 If Yes how?......................................................................................................... 
 
6. Do you pay for use of water? 1=Yes; 0=No. How much? 
• 6.1. If not paying, would you be willing to pay for water in the irrigation 
scheme? 1=Yes; 0=No 
• 6.2 If Yes much how much per month? 
• 6.3 If No why?.................................................................... 
 
7. Who do you think has the responsibility to ensure water availability 
Why?................................................................................................... 
 
8. Do you belong to Water Users Associations (WUAs)?  1= Yes   0= No 
• 8.1 If no to 8 do you know any Water Users Associations (WUAs)?  1= Yes   
0= No 
 
1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree  
• 8.2 If Yes in 8.1, the WUAs has improved water access in your irrigation 
scheme 
 
9. You are satisfied with the irrigation schedule  
10.  Government participation in irrigation water management increases your 
feeling of responsibility to manage water.  
 
11. Private sector and NGO’s participation in irrigation water management 
increase your feeling of responsibility to manage water  
 
12. Irrigation water laws are effective in the management of water resources  
13. Irrigation laws influence your decisions on resource allocation.  
14. Irrigation water laws influence your economic performance  
15. Irrigation water laws influence your cropping patterns.   
E4. INFORMAL WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree Response 
16. Are there appropriate rules existing in irrigation water management  
17. Mechanisms e.g. constitutions, to assist irrigation water management at scheme 
level exist   
 
18. The constitution is effective in the management of water resources   
19. Irrigation water policies are effective in the management of water resources.   
20. Informal water institutions are effective in the management of water resources.   
21. Informal water institutions affect your daily operation in the scheme.   
22. Informal water institutions influence your economic performance.   
23. You comply with the rules of the scheme   
24. The existing committee is effective in ensuring compliance to regulation on 
water uses 
 
25. Other water users understand the consequences of their actions in the irrigation 
scheme 
 
 
F. FARMER PARTICIPATION 
Question Response 
F1. What role do you play in the scheme management? 1= ordinary member, 2= 
committee member, 3=Executive member, 4=Other; Specify…………………………….. 
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F2. If not participating: are you willing to participate in the scheme management? 
1=Yes; 0=No 
 
F3. If not participating, give your reasons? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
F4. What has been your level of involvement in the following activities for the past year (June 2016 –
June 2017): 0=None (never involved); 1=Sometimes; 2=Always 
Activities Rank 
1. Financial based participation  
Contributing finance towards irrigation pump maintenance  
Contributing finance towards irrigation maintenance (buying material, paying the 
maintenance people, etc.) 
 
Contributing finances towards the Water Users`Association (WUA)  
2. Participation in decision making processes  
Attending irrigation meetings  
Attending irrigation/water related training  
Engaging authorities regarding water issues in the area  
Distributing information about water issues (written or verbal)  
Helping other farmers to manage/conserve water  
In electing/removing committee members  
In formulating rules in the scheme   
In irrigation water scheduling   
Other (specify)  
3. Participation in regulation and control  
Reporting unlawful behaviour (unauthorised handling etc,) 
Where do you report to?................. 
 
Reporting leakages along the canal for repairs  
How often do you attend water-related meetings (e.g. weekly, monthly, none, 
etc.)? 
 
 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
F5.  Participation in irrigation water management improves access to government support  
F6. Your participation in irrigation management increase your feeling of responsibility to manage 
water?  
F7. Your participation in water-related meetings help to lobby for local organizations to solve 
irrigation?  
 
G. CROPPING AND MARKETING SYSTEM 
 
G1. What crops do you grow, the area you planted, the output you produced and the costs you incurred. 
Crop 
name 
Area 
planted 
Quantity 
harvested 
(kgs) 
Quantity 
sold 
Price 
per 
unit 
Output 
market 
Inputs 
used 
Quantity 
Purchased 
Cost per 
unit 
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Key 
Crops  
1=Maize;            2=Tomatoes   
3=Potatoes;        4=Sugarcane  
5= Spinach;       6=Cabbage 
7=Beans;           8=Onions  
9=Butternut;     10=Other (specify) 
Market Outlet 
1=Local shop 
2=Neighbours 
3=Contractor; 4=Hawkers 
5=Shops in town 
6=Other (specify) 
Inputs used  
1=Fertilizers;      2=Herbicides  
3=Labor;            4=Transport  
5=Marketing;     6=Seeds 
7=Pesticides;     8=Tillage  
9=Packaging;    10=Other (Specify) 
G2. How often do you fail to sell your farm produce? (Never=0 Sometimes=1 Always=2) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
G3. How much do you make from your crops?  R…………. 
G4. What cropping method do you use in your plot 1=Mono-cropping; 2= Inter-cropping; 3= Crop 
rotation; 5= Other 
 
H. WATER AVAILABILITY AND IRRIGATION 
 
H1. How many times per week do you have access to water in your plot(s)?           days 
• H1.1 It is adequate? Yes=1; No=0 
• H1.2 How many minutes/hours do you let water into your plot on your 
irrigation day? 
 
        hr/mins 
H2. Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements pertaining to water access 
to your irrigation plot(s). (1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly 
Agree) 
Water is reliable  
I always get water in my plot(s)  
Water is sufficient for my cropping requirements  
I have the ability to pay for water and water-related services  
Water distribution/sharing at farm level is fair  
H3. Rate the amount of water you have received over the past 12 months. (1=less; 2=same; 3=more) 
H4.1 If changed what is the reason for this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
J: HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURE INFORMATION 
J1. Please indicate the amount spent per month on: 
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i. Food items R……………….. 
ii.  Non-food items (Electricity bill, toiletries eg soap, utility bills etc,) 
R……………………………. 
J2. What were the sources of your household income in the last 12 months? (Indicate approximately 
how much each source contributed and how often). 
 
Household Income Source Total amount (Rands) Frequency (how 
often?) 
Remittances   
Agri activities Irrigation Farming   
Dryland farming   
Livestock production   
Permanent Employment   
Temporary Employment   
Welfare grants 
 
Disability grant   
Child grant   
Pensioners grant   
Other (Specify)   
 
J3. Please answer the following questions 
Questions  Response 
Do you have access to credit? 1=Yes     0=No  
Have you taken credit or used any loan facility in the past 12 months? 1=Yes   0=No  
If Yes, what was the main source of credit?  1= Relative/ friend; 2= Money lender; 3= 
Stokvel; 4= Input supplier; 5= Output buyer; 6= Financial institution (specify name) 
 
If No to 4, please specify the reason(s). 1= Loan not required; 2= Interest rate is high; 3= 
I couldn’t secure the collateral; 4= I have got my own sufficient capital; 5= It is not easily 
accessible; 6= I am risk averse 
 
If you took credit, were you able to pay back? 1=Yes     0=No  
If No, please specify the reason 
 
 
 
K. PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 
K1. What is your main reason for farming? (1=Income 2=Extra food 3=Employment 4=Other) 
………………………. 
K2. You consider farming as a business and can be managed as such? (1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= 
Neutral 4=Disagree 5= Strongly disagree) ……………… 
K3a.You are interested in expanding your farming operations (including increasing plots).  (1= Strongly 
agree 2= Agree 3= Neutral 4=Disagree 5 = Strongly disagree) ……………. 
K3b.Why?_________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________  
K4. Do you see yourself as a potential commercial farmer one day? 1=Yes 0=No …………... 
K5. You feel confident to contribute to discussions about the irrigation scheme strategy. (1= Strongly 
agree 2= Agree 3= Neutral 4=Disagree 5 = Strongly disagree) 
K6. How satisfied are you with the performance of the scheme? (1=Very satisfied 2=Satisfied 3= 
Neutral 4= Dissatisfied 5= Very Dissatisfied) ………… 
K7. How interested are you in being a scheme committee member? (1= Very interested 2= Interested 
3=Neutral 4= Slightly disinterested 5= Not interested at all) ……………. 
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K8. How interested are you in taking part in training in collective management of irrigation scheme? 
(1= Very interested 2= Interested 3=Neutral 4= Slightly disinterested 5= Not interested at all)  
K9. When working in a group securing a sustainable use of resources for the future is important? 
(Yes=1; No=0). 
K10. How high is your confidence in farming as a means to a sustainable livelihood? (1 =Very high 2= 
High 3= Neutral 4= Low 5= Very low) ………………  
K11. How high is your confidence in yourself as a farmer? (1 =Very high 2= High 3= Average 4= Low 
5= Very low) …………... 
K12. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with following statements  
(1=Strongly disagree=1 Disagree=2 Neutral=3 Agree=4 Strongly agree=5) 
The government is not doing enough for the wellbeing of farmers  
I am optimistic about the future of farming in your area  
I am able to cope with natural shocks such as drought  
I am willing to go find a market if there aren’t any available in my area  
I enjoy new opportunities  
I do not give up easily  
I am willing to take business risks  
I am willing to invest in farming and make a loss in the short-run in order to benefit 
in the long-run 
 
I have the power to affect the outcome of my farming  
I hope the quality of life will be better  
I trust other farmers  
I would not be farming If I had a better source of income  
 
L. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
L1. Are you a member of any of the following groups? 
Group Membership (Yes=1; No=0) Function 
Cooperative   
Social group (church, stokvel, 
burial society) 
  
Other (specify)   
 
L2. Please rank the following sources of information relevant to your farming activities based on how 
you have used them in the past year (eg, market prices, when to grow, where to sell).  
1=Unimportant 2=Neutral 3= Important 
Extension Officers  NGO’s  
Media  Private organizations  
Internet  Academic institutions  
Fellow Farmer  Traditional Leaders  
Community meetings  Cooperative  
Irrigation committees  Other (specify)  
 
M.CHALLENGES IN SIS 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
There are not enough plots available in the scheme  
Irrigation scheme is too far from the homestead  
People use water illegally in the scheme  
There is a lack of market access for farm produce  
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Farmers are not willing to pay for water use  
People benefit from irrigation water but do not participate in the scheme  
Infrastructure is in poor condition  
There is inadequate water supply in the scheme  
There is unauthorised handling of water control infrastructure  
I am not satisfied with the condition of the infrastructure  
Management does not commit to infrastructure upgrade, rehabilitation and maintenance  
 
In your opinion, what causes infrastructure damage? 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
THANK YOU/SIYABONGA 
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APPENDIX 2: GUIDELINE FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION AND KEY 
INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences 
Discipline of Agricultural Economics 
Effects of interactions between governance, intergenerational and gender dimensions on 
smallholder irrigation scheme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 
Farmer Discussion Guidelines 
1. Are you aware of water policies affecting irrigation schemes in South Africa? 
2. Are you aware of the strategies set by the government for Smallholder Irrigation Schemes 
(SISs)? 
3. Are there any strategies being implemented in this irrigation scheme? 
4. Are you aware of land policies affecting SISs? 
5. What are the rules regarding land allocation? Who is responsible for land allocation in this 
irrigation scheme? 
6. What are the rules regarding water allocation? Who is responsible for water allocation? 
7. What are the general rules of this irrigation scheme? Who is responsible for the operations 
(cleaning, water scheduling, etc.) of the scheme? 
8. What are the agreements on users that violate the scheme rules? 
9. What are the rules regarding farmer participation, who attends the meetings, who elects the 
farmer representatives? 
10. What are the rules in selecting or removing a new representative committee for farmers in 
the scheme? 
11. What are the scheme rules regarding the conflict between users? 
12. What are the rules about water access in the scheme? Who regulates water access? 
13. Which governmental bodies engage with farmers in SISs and how? What are their roles? 
14. Which other stakeholders are involved in the scheme and what are their roles? 
15. What are the rules in getting water licenses and permission to occupy?  
16. What are the rules in selecting or removing a new representative committee for farmers in 
the scheme? 
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APPENDIX 3: ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
 
 
